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Chapter 1
Introduction
Broadly, my dissertation studies how social preferences affect the design of incentives and con-
tracts in organizations. This includes studying how non-monetary incentives and, in particular,
job characteristics such as impact on society (henceforth, the job’s “mission”), can be part of a
compensation package offered by an employer to attract and motivate his workers. This is the
central topic of my dissertation, and in particular of Chapter 2 and 3. This broad area of my
research also includes related work studying how notions of fairness and justice are shaped by
experience. This is the central topic of Chapter 4.
Much empirical evidence shows that workers, especially those in the public or social sector,
care about the mission of their job, in addition to their wage. My research uses theoretical and
experimental methods to study how principals can use the choice of a project mission as part
of a contract, to screen and incentivize such motivated agents.
In my second Chapter “Optimal contracting with endogenous project mission”1, I study
a model in which a principal selects an agent to develop a project and influences the agent’s
ex post level of effort not by outcome-contingent rewards, but by the choice of the project
mission. The principal’s and the agents’ preferences about the mission are misaligned and the
degree to which an agent cares about the mission is private information. I derive the optimal
mechanism (allocation rule, project mission, payment) to select and motivate the agent. I show
that under the optimal mechanism, the project mission is distorted towards the principal’s ideal
mission compared to the full information optimum. As a consequence, effort is lower. If the
mission must be chosen prior to the allocation of the project, competition brings the principal
to align the mission more with the agent’s preferences, which increases his effort. Finally, in
the presence of budget constraints, the principal should offer the same mission and the same
payment to all types of agents. I then compare some of my predictions with existing empirical
evidence on the bidding strategies used by profit and non-profit firms for the allocation of aid
contracts. The model can be applied to the design and allocation of procurement contracts for
the provision of social goods, to the design and allocation of research grants, and more generally
to job design within organizations.
In my third Chapter, “Job Mission as a Substitute for Monetary Incentives: Experimental
Evidence”2, I ask whether principals use monetary and non-monetary incentives as substitutes
1This paper must be cited as: Cassar, L. (2014) “Optimal contracting with endogenous project mission”
Working Paper.
2This paper must be cited as: Cassar, L. (2014) “Job mission as a substitute for monetary incentives:
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in motivating effort. I address this question in a laboratory experiment in which the choice of
the job mission is part of the compensation package that principals can use to influence agents’
effort. Principals offer contracts that specify a piece rate and a charity – which can be either
the preferred charity of the agent, or the one of the principal. The agents then exert a level of
effort that generates a profit for the principal and a donation to the specified charity. My results
show that the agents exert more effort than the level that maximizes their own pecuniary payoff
in order to benefit the charity, especially their preferred one. The principals take advantage of
this intrinsic motivation by offering lower piece rates and by using the choice of the charity as
a substitute to motivate effort. However, I also find that because of fairness considerations, the
majority of principals are reluctant to lower the piece rate below a fair threshold, making the
substitution between monetary and non-monetary incentives imperfect. These findings have
implications for the design of incentives in mission-oriented organizations and contribute to our
understanding of job satisfaction and wage differentials across organizations and sectors.
A related area of my dissertation deals with how social preferences are influenced by expe-
rience with different kinds of incentive systems. Empirical evidence suggests that preferences
for redistribution are not only driven by self-interest, but also by individuals’ views on what is
a fair distribution of income in society. The determinants of these fairness views are, however,
largely unknown. In my fourth Chapter “A Matter of Perspective: How Fairness Views Depend
on Relative Income” joint with Arnd H. Klein3, we show that individuals’ relative income, and
how this income was generated – through a random lottery or a competitive tournament –
affect their fairness views. This effect is such that low-income individuals redistribute signif-
icantly more than high-income individuals when the source of income differences is the same
as the one they experienced themselves. We interpret this as evidence of a self-serving bias in
responsibility attribution, which is supported by our data: compared to low-income individuals,
high-income individuals tend to believe more that their outcome is the result of internal rather
than external factors. Hence, having experienced more or less success based on a particular
incentive and reward structure leads individuals to differentially interpret the fairness of that
type of incentive. These findings are relevant for future theoretical and empirical studies on
perceptions of fairness in organizations and, more broadly, on distributive justice: Fairness
views about the distribution of rewards and income should not be treated as exogenous, as
they are likely to be affected by individuals’ own experience and income.
Experimental evidence” Working Paper.
3This paper must be cited as: Cassar, L. and Klein, A.H. (2014) “A Matter of Perspective: How Fairness
Views Depend on Relative Income” Working Paper.
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Chapter 2
Optimal Contracting with Endogenous
Project Mission
Empirical studies show that workers, especially those in the public and social sector, are often
driven only partly by financial rewards, but also by the mission of their job, i.e., by the overall
job design and characteristics: the type of good that is provided, how it is provided, to whom
it is provided, and so on.1 This evidence suggests that the job mission can be used as a
contracting tool by governments and employers of international, public or social organizations,
to incentivize and screen their workers. To date, however, we know little about the role of the
mission in optimal contracting for the provision of public goods and services.
In this paper, I analyze a mechanism design problem in which a principal must select one
among many agents to develop a project and can influence the level of effort that the selected
agent will put into the project not by outcome-contingent rewards, but by the choice of the
project mission. The principal and the agents derive an intrinsic benefit from pursuing certain
(observable) missions and therefore, from the project being designed in a certain way. The
closer is the project mission to an agent’s ideal mission, the higher is the level of effort that the
agent will put into the project. The mission preferences of the principal and of the agents are,
however, misaligned. This misalignment implies that in choosing a project mission the principal
faces a trade-off between pursuing his ideal mission and extracting effort from the selected
agent. The agent’s effort is, indeed, observable ex-post but not contractible. Furthermore, the
degree to which the agent cares about the mission is his private information, i.e., the agents
have heterogeneous and unobservable intrinsic motivation levels. Thus, the principal faces, in
addition, an adverse selection problem.2
I derive the optimal rule that should be adopted by the principal to select the agent and
the optimal contract, consisting of a project mission and a payment, that should be offered to
that agent. I also consider a simpler mechanism in which the project mission is fixed prior to
1Recent evidence includes Ashraf et al. (2014), Carpenter and Gong (2013), Gerhards (2013), Cassar (2014a).
See Perry et al. (2010) for a comprehensive overview of the empirical literature on public sector motivation in
the last 20 years and Francois and Vlassopoulos (2008) for a review of the theoretical literature on this topic.
2Importantly, the ideal missions of the agents are assumed to be equally distant from the principal’s ideal
mission. This means that the screening problem faced by the principal is uni-dimensional and refers to the
agents’ intrinsic motivation. Mechanism design problems where private information is multi-dimensional are
hardly tractable and highly dependent on the exact parameters’ values and functions’ specifications (Asker and
Cantillon (2010)).
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the allocation of the project and, therefore, in which the principal only uses the payment to
screen the agents. Finally, I study the same optimal contracting problem, but in the presence of
budget constraints. In this setting, the agent’s effort can be interpreted as the agent’s ex-post
financial investment into the project, whose costs must be covered by the principal’s payment,
i.e., the budget. This extension captures the contracting of public projects that are highly
capital intensive, and where the agent has the expertise to make the investment but is not
expected to financially contribute to the project. This is the case, for instance, in scientific and
medical research projects or when the agent is an NGO with no access to independent resources.
This extension, in addition to represent a novel theoretical problem, is of high relevance for
the contracting over missions, because as it will be shown, the screening role of the mission
is strongly tied to the principal’s possibility of saving on the financial payments given to the
agents with higher intrinsic motivation levels. When this possibility comes short, the mission
fills solely an incentivizing role.
The analysis presented in this paper is relevant for a wide set of labor market environments
where the mission of the job is part of the compensation package that a principal can use to
select and motivate his employees. The model applies, for instance, to the design and allocation
of procurement contracts for the provision of social goods and services. Governments and
aid agencies regularly face the problem of selecting private organizations for the development
of social projects in various fields (poverty reduction, education, health ...). Given that the
contracts for the provision of public goods are often incomplete, the procurers must rely, to a
large extent, on the unobservable intrinsic motivation of the selected organization’s employees
to put effort into the project. Furthermore, the procurer and the selected organization may
not have identical preferences on how the project should be designed. Taking the example
of an educational project, the government and the founders of a non-profit organization may
have different views on the role of education and teaching methods: they may disagree on the
educational curricula that should be taught, on how to select and pay the teachers, on whether
to prioritize the quality versus the costs of education, on beneficiaries’ targeting, on the role
of religion in the school, and so on. Such “ideological” issues are frequently encountered in
situations where non-profits are involved (Besley and Ghatak, 1999, 2001).
Similarly, the model can be applied to the design and allocation of research grants. Donors,
such as public agencies or private foundations, must choose the allocation rule, the amount of
the grant, and how many conditions to attach to the grant. These conditions typically concern
the research questions that can be addressed, the research methods that can be used, and so
on. The number of conditions and their level of detail will determine how much freedom the
researcher will have to pursue his own research agenda, and in turn how much effort he will be
willing to put into the project.3 Thus, if donors have different, more policy oriented, research
agendas than academics, they face similar trade-offs than the ones described in this paper.
More generally, this analysis applies to the optimal design of jobs within organizations
where employees care about the level of discretion they are given in solving their tasks.4 In this
3It is worth emphasizing that the model is not meant to formalize the allocation of grants as a form of prizes
for the best project’s proposal, as it is the case in Che and Gale (2003). In my framework, there are no sunk
investments. The effort decision is only made by the winning agent after he has been allocated the project.
4This seems particularly relevant for those tasks that involve a certain level of creativity from the agent.
Think for instance of a newspaper’s director who needs to decide how much to pay his journalists and at the
same time how much discretion to leave them in writing their articles. The newspaper may want to have strict
rules on how articles should be written and on what topics should be covered. Journalists, on the other hand,
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respect, the paper points to a different “hidden cost of control” which, contrary to Falk and
Kosfeld (2006), Bartling et al. (2012, 2013), does not arise from the perception that the lack
of discretion is a signal of the principal’s distrust, but from the fact that workers have direct
preferences on how to solve their tasks, and these preferences are not always aligned with the
ones of their employers. In this setting it may be optimal for the principal to offer his employee
a menu of contracts with different levels of wage and discretion and let the employee self-select
in one of these contracts based on his intrinsic motivation level. This paper looks at the optimal
menu of contracts to offer to the employee.
This paper belongs to the contract theory literature with motivated agents (Besley and
Ghatak, 2005; Chau and Huysentruyt, 2006; Delfgaauw and Dur, 2007, 2008; Murdock, 2002;
Benabou and Tirole, 2003, 2006). In an important part of the literature, the worker’s intrinsic
benefit of exerting effort has been assumed to depend on the (exogenous) intrinsic motivation
level of the agent only. This intrinsic motivation varies across agents and is unobservable to
the principal, leading to an optimal contracting problem with adverse selection.5 These papers,
however, do not model mission preferences. Therefore, the principal has no power of influencing
the intrinsic motivation of the agents.
In the seminal paper by Besley and Ghatak (2005), principal and agents are assumed to
derive an intrinsic benefit from pursuing certain missions: agents who work for a principal
whose mission is closely aligned with their ideal mission, derive higher intrinsic benefit and
thus, ceteris paribus, exert more effort, than agents who work for a principal with a different
mission. The authors show that a principal can save on monetary incentives if he is matched
with an agent who shares his same mission preferences. In their setting, however, the job mission
is assumed to be exogenous6 and motivated agents vary in their mission preferences rather than
in how much they care about the project mission. Furthermore, in their model, there are no
informational asymmetries and the matching of principals and agents is derived by an analysis
of stable matching rather than by the derivation of an optimal allocation mechanism. This
paper contributes to this literature by studying an adverse selection problem in the presence
of mission preferences and by endowing the principal with a non-monetary instrument, i.e. the
choice of the project mission, to influence the agents’ motivation of exerting effort.
More generally, the paper also relates to those studies that analyze non-monetary devices to
screen and incentivize agents with non-standard preferences. Previous studies have emphasized
the role of status incentives (Besley and Ghatak (2008)), workers’ identity (Akerlof and Kranton
(2005, 2008)), bonus contracts (Fehr et al. (2007)), recruitment of biased workers (Prendergast
(2007, 2008)), and reciprocal incentives (Englmaier and Leider (2012)).
Finally, the paper relates to the theoretical literature on delegation (e.g. Holmstrom (1984);
Aghion and Tirole (1997); Alonso and Matouschek (2008); Armstrong and Vickers (2010);
Frankel (2014)). This literature addresses the question of how to allocate the right to select
actions or projects between a principal and an agent. In these models, however, ex-ante infor-
mational asymmetries between the principal and the agent, if any, do not refer to the agent’s
intrinsic motivation, but to the payoff-relevant state of the world or to the set of feasible
may want to write on what interests them the most and be free to choose their writing style.
5Studies that have looked at optimal contracting when agents vary in their intrinsic motivation include
Francois (2003), and Delfgaauw and Dur (2007, 2008).
6The authors only briefly discuss the possibility of relaxing the assumption of exogenous job mission but
leave the detailed analysis for future work.
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projects.
In the benchmark model in Section 4, I show that under the optimal mechanism the principal
makes a smaller compromise on the mission than the full information optimum. In other words,
because the agents’ intrinsic motivation levels are private information, it is optimal for the
principal to set a project mission that is closer to his ideal mission - and thus more distant from
the agent’s preferences - compared to the case in which the principal could observe the agents’
intrinsic motivation levels. As a consequence, the agent’s effort is also lower. This distortion
arises because the informational rent given to the agents with higher intrinsic motivation is
increasing in the effort level of the agents with lower intrinsic motivation. This also implies
that while under complete information the project mission is always closer to the agent’s than to
the principal’s preferences, under asymmetric information this only holds true for the missions
contracted with agents with sufficiently high intrinsic motivation levels. Finally, I show that
the optimal mechanism can be implemented through a scoring auction7 where agents bid a
proposal for the project mission and a payment, and whose scoring rule over-penalizes a non-
compliance of the agent’s proposal with the principal’s ideal mission compared to the principal’s
utility function. Under this scoring auction, agents with higher intrinsic motivation levels bid
a lower payment and a project mission that is more distant from the principal’ ideal mission,
compared to the agents with lower intrinsic motivation levels. This prediction is consistent
with the existing empirical evidence on the bidding strategies used by profits and non-profits
for the allocation of aid contracts.
In Section 5, I derive the optimal mechanism if the project mission must be chosen prior to
the allocation of the project. This means that the principal cannot condition the mission on the
agent’s type. I show that an increase in competition, defined as the number of agents competing
for the project, brings the principal to align the mission more with the agent’s preferences,
which increases his effort. Also, I show that the project mission under this simpler mechanism
is better aligned with the agents’ preferences compared to the expected project mission of the
mechanism described above, in which the principal can condition both the mission and the
payment on the agent’s type. This stems from the fact that, in the scoring auction, the agents
are also competing along the mission dimension and these competitive forces drive up their
expected ideological compromise.8
In Section 6, I analyze the same optimal contracting problem assuming the presence of
budget constraints and one agent only. In this setting the principal’s payment represents
the budget available to the agent to develop the project, and the agent’s effort can now be
interpreted as the agent’s ex-post monetary investment in the project. This means that the
payment acts as an upper bound on the agent’s investment, as it must cover its costs. This
7A scoring auction is a multi-dimensional auction that requires to bid on other variables in addition to the
price. Bids are evaluated by a scoring rule designed and announced ex-ante by the auctioneer. The bidder with
higher total score wins.
8While the effect of competition in private good procurement has been widely studied, no equivalent evidence
exists in the context of social good provision with motivated agents. Theoretical contributions on the effect
of competition between motivated agents have focused on private fund-raising (Aldashev and Verdier (2010);
Aldashev et al. (2013)), matching with mission-oriented organizations (Besley and Ghatak (2005, 2006)), organi-
zational choice (Ghatak and Mueller (2011, 2013)) and corporate culture (Kosfeld and von Siemens (2011)). An
exception is Chau and Huysentruyt (2006), which studies non-profits’ competition for a procurement contract.
The authors show that a competitive tender for the allocation of public funds leads to an ideological compromise
between the missions of the principal and the contracted non-profit. Their paper, however, does not derive the
optimal mechanism and does not study the effect of competition by varying the number of competitors.
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extension captures those situations in which a principal allocates a budget to an agent with
expertise, who should then invest it in a public project. As contracts are incomplete, the amount
of the budget that the agent will actually invest - rather than keep for personal consumption
or waste - depends on the agent’s intrinsic motivation and on the extent to which the mission
of the project reflects his preferences. I show that in this setting the optimal contract is a
pooling contract: the optimal project mission and the optimal payment are not contingent on
the agent’s intrinsic motivation level. In other words, it is not optimal for the principal to screen
the agent. Compared to the main model, the principal can no longer save on payments by better
aligning the project mission with the agent’s ideal mission. As the project mission gets closer
to the agent’s ideal mission, the agent’s investment increases, but only to the extent allowed by
the payment-budget. That is, the ideological and the financial compensation are complements
rather than substitutes. I show that for a separating equilibrium to be implementable, types
with low intrinsic motivation levels must receive very high financial rents. This turns out not
to be optimal for the principal.
2.1. The Model
Consider the following environment: a principal needs to allocate a contract to one among n
motivated agents for the realization of an indivisible project. The contract specifies a project
mission, m, and a payment, p. The agent who is allocated the contract (m, p) will then exert a
level of effort, e, to develop the project. I assume the output of the project to be equal to the
agent’s effort. This coincides with assuming a linear production function Y (e) = e. Alterna-
tively, e can be interpreted as the probability of a high output. To avoid confusion, throughout
the paper I will only refer to the agent’s effort rather than to the project’s output. Consistent
with many standard agency models for the provision of public goods,9 due to contracts’ incom-
pleteness and non-enforceability of effort, the latter is assumed to be observable ex-post but
not contractible.
Agents vary in their innate intrinsic motivation level, θ. Everything else being equal, agents
with higher θ derive higher intrinsic benefit from putting effort into the project. Each agent
only knows his own intrinsic motivation; the other agents and the principal perceive types
as being independently drawn from a distribution function F (.) on the interval [0, 1]. F (.) is
assumed to satisfy the monotone hazard rate property, i.e. ∂[(1− F (θ))/f(θ)]/∂θ < 0.
The agents and the principal are endowed with different observable mission preferences, i.e.
they disagree on what the project mission should be. Let’s define by mD the ideal mission of
the principal and by mi the ideal mission of agent i. I present here the simplest version of the
model: m, mD, and mi are one-dimensional variables and missions preferences are homogenous
across agents, i.e. mi = mA ∀ i.10 For the sake of notational simplicity let me standardize the
9I refer the reader to Francois and Vlassopoulos (2008) for a review of this literature
10As mentioned in the introduction, relaxing the assumption of agents’ homogenous mission preferences would
lead to a multidimensional screening problem that is not tractable in this setting. Because of the endogeneity
of the direction in which the incentive compatibility constraints bind, the optimal mechanism design problem
where private information is multidimensional is hardly tractable and, if it is, it depends finely on the exact
parameters of the problem and cannot be implemented by standard auction format or other practical and simple
contracting procedures, as also stated in Asker and Cantillon (2010). Therefore, it goes beyond the scope of
this analysis.
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missions’ values to mA > mD ≥ 0. It follows that the value taken by the project mission must
lie between mD and mA, i.e. mA ≥ m ≥ mD.11
Formally, the agents’ and the principal’s preferences can be represented as follows. The
utility of agent i, i = 1, ..., n from winning the contract is given by
Ui(ei;m, p) = p+ θiG(mA −m)ei − ψ(ei) (1)
G(mA − m) represents an ideology function, with properties G′(mA − m) < 0, G′(0) = 0,
G′′(mA −m) < 0. It is a function that increases as m gets closer to the agent’s ideal mission
mA, or, more intuitively, it is a function that decreases in the distance between m and mA, i.e.
in the agent’s ideological compromise. Notice that the intrinsic benefit derived from exerting
effort - the second term in (1) - results from the interaction between the agent’s exogenous
intrinsic motivation level and the extent to which the project mission is aligned with his own
ideal mission. As m gets closer to mA, the utility that the agent gets from putting effort into
the project increases. This increase is higher the larger is θi, i.e. agents with higher intrinsic
motivation get a higher intrinsic benefit from a decrease in their ideological compromise. ψ(ei)
represents the standard disutility of effort, ψ′ > 0, ψ′′ > 0. To allow for an explicit solution, I
will assume that ψ(ei) =
1
2
e2i . If the agent is not allocated the project, he receives a reservation
utility u.
The utility of the principal from contracting with agent i is
VD(m, p; ei) = θDG(m−mD)ei − p (2)
where θD is a fixed parameter capturing how much the principal cares about the project’s
output. G(.) is the same function as for the agents in equation (1), but centered at mD rather
than at mA. If the principal does not allocate the project, his utility is zero.
Figure (2.1) provides an example of the agents’ and the principal’s ideology functions. Notice
that, in principle, G(.) can also take negative values. If the project mission is too far away
from one’s ideal mission, there are intrinsic costs rather than intrinsic benefits associated with
the development of the project. It follows that a necessary condition for the contract to be
allocated is that the principal’s and the agents’ ideal missions are sufficiently close. Graphically,
this means that the ideology function of the principal, G(m−mD), and the ideology function
of the agents, G(mA − m), take a positive value at their crossing point. In the remainder of
the paper, I will simply assume, as in Figure (2.1), that G(mA −mD) > 0.
It is worth mentioning that the model naturally extends to heterogeneous k-dimensional mis-
sions, provided that the distance between the k-dimensional vector mD and the k-dimensional
vector mi is kept constant across agents: d(mD,mi) = ||mD −mi|| = d ∀i. In such a multi-
dimensional setting, the principal would not contract a specific project mission m but rather a
maximal allowed distance between the project mission and his own ideal mission, d(mD,m). It
follows that once the contract has been allocated, the winning agent would be free to implement
any project mission m ∈ Rk whose distance from the principal’s ideal mission is equal or smaller
11As an explanatory example, suppose that the principal and the agents disagree on beneficiaries’ targeting:
while the principal would like an equal representation of beneficiaries from ethnic group A and from ethnic
group B, the agents are only interested in helping ethnic group A. These mission preferences can be represented
by defining the project mission as the percentage of beneficiaries from ethnic A. Then mA will correspond to
100 and mD to 50.
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Figure 2.1
Ideology Functions
than the distance allowed in the contract. In practice, the choice of d(mD,m) would translate
into a number of binding conditions about the project’s characteristics that will be specified
in the contract. The higher the number and\or the stronger the conditions, the smaller is
d(mD,m). What is not specified in the contract would be left to the agent’s discretion. There-
fore, the contract can also be interpreted as one that allocates control over the project’s design
between the winning agent and the principal.
Given the contract (m, p), agent i chooses an effort level equal to
e∗i (m, θi) = θiG(mA −m) (3)
This effort function is known to the principal. However, since θi is not observable, at the time
of offering the contract the principal does not know the effort level that the agent will put into
the project.
2.2. Full Information Optimum
Before proceeding to the model with asymmetric information, I characterize the full information
optimum, which already generates some relevant insights. If θi were observable, the principal
would select the agent with the highest intrinsic motivation level, choose the project mission
that maximizes total surplus, and set the payment to make the agent’s participation constraint
bind, Ui = u. More specifically, under complete information the optimal mission m
∗(θi) and
the optimal payment p∗(θi) satisfy respectively:
θi
θD
=
G′(m∗ −mD)
G′(mA −m∗) −
G(m∗ −mD)
G(mA −m∗) (4)
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p∗ = u− 1
2
θ2iG(mA −m∗)2 (5)
This solution has two important implications. First, comparative statics reveals that mA −
m∗i (θi) is decreasing in θi.
12 That is, the higher is the agent’s intrinsic motivation level, the
closer is project mission to the agent’s ideal mission. This is not surprising as it follows directly
from the interaction between the agents’ ideology function and the intrinsic motivation level
θi. Agents with higher intrinsic motivation levels are more responsive to a decrease in their
ideological compromise, both in terms of a higher increase in their level of effort and of a higher
increase in the intrinsic benefit that they derive from it. It follows that the higher is θi, the more
the principal can save on payments by moving the project mission towards the agents’ ideal
mission. Essentially, the principal is giving an ideological compensation to highly motivated
agents, and a financial compensation to agents with lower intrinsic motivation.
Second, under complete information the principal bears the biggest ideological compromise,
that is, the project mission is always closer to the agent’s ideal mission than to the principal’s
one.13 The intuition for this result is simple. The principal’s surplus consists of the product of
two factors: the agent’s level of effort put into the project and how much the principal values
that level of effort. This product is, thus, maximized when the project mission is half way
between the principal’s ideal mission and the agent’s ideal mission. On the contrary, the agent’s
surplus is maximized when the project mission is equal to the agents’ ideal one. It follows, that
the socially optimal mission is closer to the agent’s than to the principal’s preferences. In other
words, by better aligning the project mission with the agent’s ideal mission, the principal saves
on the payments due to the agent.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that in a model in which the agents were varying in their
ability, i.e. cost of exerting effort, rather than in the degree to which they care about the
project mission, we would not obtain the same results. Indeed, in that case, agents with higher
ability would still exert more effort than agents with lower ability, but the benefit they would
derive from any single unit of effort would be the same as other agents. This leads to a first
best project mission that is independent of the agent’s type. Furthermore, the project mission
would be better aligned with the preferences of the party who has a higher valuation for it.
However, the principal cannot observe θi. Thus, to select and incentivize an agent he uses
the mechanism explained below. Without loss of generality, throughout the remainder of the
paper I will set u = 0.
12To see this, notice that if θi increases, the LHS in equation (4) increases, so the RHS in equation (4) must
also increase, which means that either G′(mi − mD)/G′(mA − mi) increases or G(mi − mD)/G(mA − mi)
decreases, or both. Since G(x) is decreasing in x, G(mi−mD)/G(mA−mi) gets smaller as mA−mi decreases
and mi −mD increases. Similarly, since G(x) is decreasing and concave, G′(mi −mD)/G′(mA −mi) increases
as G′(mi−mD) decreases (i.e. becomes more negative) and G′(mA−mi) increases (i.e. becomes less negative),
that is, as mA −mi decreases and mi −mD increases. This implies that m∗i (θi) is increasing.
13To see this, notice that because the LHS in equation (4) is always positive, G(mA − m)/G′(mA − m) ≤
G(m − mD)/G′(m − mD). Since G(x) is decreasing and concave, this implies that mA − m ≤ m − mD.
Mind, however, that this result would not necessarily hold if the principal and the agents had different ideology
functions G(.).
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2.3. Optimal Mechanism
Without loss of generality, I restrict my attention to direct and incentive compatible mecha-
nisms. That is, I look for a mechanism that specifies a probability of winning the project qi(.),
a project mission mi(.), and a payment pi(.) as functions of the agents’ reported intrinsic moti-
vation levels (θˆ1, ..., θˆn) = θˆ, and that induces a truth-telling Bayesian Nash equilibrium, θˆ = θ.
For sake of notational simplicity, let qi(θi), mi(θi) and pi(θi) define, respectively, Eθ−iqi(θ),
Eθ−imi(θ) and Eθ−ipi(θ).
The principal’s optimization problem under incomplete information is then
max
qi(.),mi(.),pi(.)
Eθ
( n∑
i=1
qi(θ)θDG(mi(θ)−mD)e∗i − pi(θ)
)
(6)
subject to
θi ∈ arg max
θˆi∈Θ
Ui(θˆi, θi) = Eθ−i
(
pi(θˆi, θ−i) + qi(θˆi, θ−i)θiG(mA −mi(θˆi, θ−i))e∗i − 12e∗i 2
)
(7)
Ui(θi) ≥ 0 (8)
e∗i = θiG(mA −mi(θ)) (9)
n∑
i=1
qi(θ) ≤ 1 and qi(θ) ≥ 0 for any θ, i = 1, ..., n. (10)
where Ui(θˆi, θi) is the expected utility of agent i when he reports his intrinsic motivation level to
be θˆi and all the other agents report their intrinsic motivation levels truthfully, and where Ui(θi)
is the agent’s i expected utility when telling the truth. The incentive compatibility constraint
in (7) then imposes that Ui(θˆi, θi) is maximized at θˆi = θi, that is, it should be optimal for agent
i to report his type truthfully. Equations (8), (9), (10) represent, respectively, the individual
rationality constraint, the agent’s ex-post optimal level of effort, and the basic properties of
the probability function. The solution to this problem leads to the first proposition:
Proposition 1 Under the optimal mechanism:
a)The project is allocated to the agent with the highest intrinsic motivation:
q∗i (θ) =
{
1 if θi > max∀j 6=i θj
0 otherwise
(11)
b)The project mission contracted with agent i satisfies:
θi − 21−F (θi)f(θi)
θD
=
G′(m∗i −mD)
G′(mA −m∗i )
− G(m
∗
i −mD)
G(mA −m∗i )
(12)
c)The expected payment of agent i satisfies:
p∗i (θi) =
∫ θi
0
Eθ−i
(
qi(ti, θ−i)tiG(mA −mi(ti, θ−i))2
)
dti −Eθ−i
(
qi(θ)
1
2
θ2iG(mA −mi(θ))2
)
(13)
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Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 deserves some comments. First, notice that the project is always allocated
to the agent who has the highest intrinsic motivation level. Thus, there is no exclusion of
types. Second, and more importantly, notice that equation (12) is equal to equation (4) with
the additional negative term −2(1 − F (θi))/f(θi) on the LHS. This implies that, with the
exception of the project mission of the highest type in the distribution, the project missions
of all the other types are distorted towards the principal’s ideal mission compared to the full
information optimum. As a consequence, the ex-post level of effort of the winning agent is
also lower.14 This inefficiency arises because the informational rent that the principal must pay
the agents with higher intrinsic motivation to prevent them from imitating agents with lower
intrinsic motivation is a decreasing function of the ideological compromise of the agents with
lower intrinsic motivation - as the first term in equation (13) suggests. Thus, by increasing the
ideological compromise of the latter beyond the full information optimum, the principal saves
on the informational rents. The project mission of the highest type is not distorted because no
other type wants to imitate the highest type. Proposition 1 also implies that, contrary to the
full information optimum, agents with θi ≤ 2(1− F (θi))/f(θi) contract a project mission that
is closer to the principal’s ideal mission than to their own.
Notice, furthermore, that given the regularity assumption about F (.), the LHS of equation
(12) is still increasing in θi. Thus, the higher is the intrinsic motivation level of the winning
agent, the closer is the project mission to his ideal mission, the lower is the payment, and the
higher is his ex-post level of effort.
Finally, the higher is the weight that the principal attributes to output, θD, compared to
payments, the closer is the project mission to the prefect mid-way compromise, mD+mA
2
. This
holds true for all agent’s intrinsic motivation levels. So in other words, as θD increases, the
optimal contract (m∗i (θi), p
∗
i (θi)) “converges” towards a pooling contract with mission
mD+mA
2
.
2.3.1. Implementation
How can the optimal mechanism be implemented in practice? By applying the results in Che
(1993) to this model, I derive the next proposition:
Proposition 2 The optimal outcome can be implemented through a first- or second-score auc-
tion whose scoring rule over-penalizes a non-compliance with the principal’s ideal mission com-
pared to the principal’s (true) utility function.
Proof. See Appendix.
A scoring auction is a multi-dimensional auction where agents bid on both the price and the
project mission, and bids are evaluated by a scoring rule designed and announced ex-ante by
the principal. The bidder with higher total score wins. More specifically, under the first-score
auction the winner develops the project with the offered mission at the offered price. In the
14This is consistent with the standard adverse selection result of “no distortion at the top” and with previous
theoretical literature with non-motivated agents and explicit incentive schemes. In a setting with both adverse
selection and moral hazard, Laffont and Tirole (1987) and McAfee and McMillan (1987) show that under the
optimal mechanism the level of effort is lower than under the full-information optimum.
14
second score auction the winner is required to match the highest rejected score in the auction
- with no additional constraints attached on the combination of mission-price.
A scoring rule specifies the weights that are given to the price and to the mission in cal-
culating the bidder’s score. Proposition 2 suggests that the optimal scoring rule induces the
agents to bid a project mission that is closer to the principal’s ideal mission than under the
full information optimum. This naturally follows from Proposition 1. In practice, this means
that the optimal scoring rule includes an additional argument to the true utility function of the
principal that subtracts a higher number of points as the distance between m and mD increases.
This argument represents the informational rent due by the principal to the agent in order to
satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint.15
Consistent with the model, public and international organizations such as EuropeAid, US-
AID, the UK’s Department for International Development, and the World Bank’s International
Development Association, often use scoring auctions to allocate aid contracts: In practice, at
the launch of the tender, these organizations release the project’s “Terms of Reference” (TOR)
along with the scoring rule that will be adopted to evaluate each bid. The TOR is a document
that describes in details the ideal project mission from these organizations’ point of view. In
terms of this model, it means that they announce mD. Then, each competing candidates bid a
price and a proposal on the project’s design and characteristics. Finally, the procurer’s designed
scoring rule assigns a score to the offered price and to each aspect of the proposal on the extent
to which it conforms with the specified TOR. The bidder with highest total score wins.
2.3.2. Empirical evidence
The model fits some recent empirical evidence regarding the bidding strategies used by profits
and non-profits in scoring auctions for the allocation of aid contracts by the UK’s Department of
International Development (DFID). The data set analyzed in Huysentruyt (2011) was collected
and constructed by the author at the DFID’s office in Scotland. This data set includes detailed
information about all the 457 aid service contracts that were allocated through scoring auctions
between the period 1998 and 2003, including the terms of reference as well as the 1,222 bids that
were made for these contracts. Among other things, the paper looks at how bidding strategies,
contract outcomes and participation in specific tenders vary between profits and non-profits.
The main results in Huysentruyt (2011) can be summarized as follows:
Fact 1 Non-profits make bids that score on average 4 to 6 percentage points worse on their
compliance with the DFID’s terms of reference (TOR) relative to for-profits (holding the tender
constant).
Fact 2 The overall prices proposed by non-profits are approximately 60% cheaper, on average,
than the prices proposed by for-profits (holding the tender constant).
These results are consistent with the model if we reasonably assume that workers in non-
profit organizations have on average a higher intrinsic motivation than workers in for-profit
organizations. Agents with higher intrinsic motivation are willing to sacrifice financial gains in
favor of a higher level of control over the project mission. Therefore, they will bid a lower price
for developing the project and will bid a project mission that is more distant from the principal’s
15See the Appendix for a mathematical expression of the optimal scoring rule.
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ideal mission. On the other hand, agents with lower intrinsic motivation prefer to comply more
with the principal’s ideal mission in order to receive higher payments. As a consequence, they
will bid a higher price for developing the project and will bid a project mission that is closer to
the principal’s ideal mission. So overall, highly motivated agents are more likely to score less
on the mission dimension and more on the financial dimension than agents with low intrinsic
motivation.16
2.4. Optimal Mechanism with Ex-ante Fixed Mission
In this section, I analyze a simpler mechanism in which the project mission is fixed prior
to the allocation of the project and, therefore, the agents are only screened based on the
financial dimension. I then compare this simpler mechanism to the one described above. The
optimization problem is the same as the one in Section 4, with the exception that now the
project mission m cannot be conditioned on the agent’s type θi:
max
qi(.),m,pi(.)
Eθ
( n∑
i=1
qi(θ)θDG(m−mD)e∗i − pi(θ)
)
(14)
subject to
θi ∈ arg max
θˆi∈Θ
Ui(θˆi, θi) = Eθ−i
(
pi(θˆi, θ−i) + qi(θˆi, θ−i)θiG(mA −m)e∗i − 12e∗i 2
)
(15)
Ui(θi) ≥ 0 (16)
e∗i = θiG(mA −m) (17)
n∑
i=1
qi(θ) ≤ 1 and qi(θ) ≥ 0 for any θ, i = 1, ..., n. (18)
The solution to this problem leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Under the optimal mechanism:
a)The project is allocated to the agent with the highest intrinsic motivation:
q∗i (θ) =
{
1 if θi > max∀j 6=i θj
0 otherwise
(19)
b)The ex-ante chosen project mission satisfies:
E[Y 22 ]
θDE[Y1]
=
G′(m∗ −mD)
G′(mA −m∗) −
G(m∗ −mD)
G(mA −m∗) (20)
16It is worth mentioning that this evidence does not prove that the DFID is actually using the optimal
scoring auction. Other non-optimal scoring auctions may lead to similar results, as long as non-profits care
more about the mission than for-profit organizations. Rather, this evidence suggests that the model in Section
2 is a good representation of the aid contracting environment and of the preferences of the actors involved in
that environment.
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where E[Y1] and E[Y
2
2 ] represent, respectively, the expected value of the first order statistic of n
independently drawn θi and the expected value of the second order statistic of n independently
drawn θ2i .
c)The expected payment of agent i satisfies:
p∗i (θi) =
∫ θi
0
Eθ−i
(
qi(ti, θ−i)tiG(mA −m)2
)
dti − Eθ−i
(
qi(θ)
1
2
θ2iG(mA −m)2
)
(21)
d) The optimal mechanism can be implemented through a (reverse) price-only auction with the
ex-ante chosen project mission in (20) .
Proof. See Appendix.
Depending on the specific assumptions about the ideology function G(.) and the distribution
function F (.), the optimal mechanism might lead to the exclusion of some types, which would
be implementable by imposing a ceiling price in the price auction. Proposition 3 reports the
results when the optimal mechanism does not lead to such exclusion, while the more general
results can be found in the Appendix. But the main point is that while the principal always
allocates the project if he can condition the mission on the winner’s type, if the mission must be
fixed ex-ante the optimal auction may require a ceiling price depending on the specification of
the utility functions, so the project is not always allocated. The intuition for this difference is
simple. The principal wants to prevent agents with higher intrinsic motivation from imitating
agents with lower intrinsic motivation. If the mission must be fixed-ex ante, the principal can
only use the price to screen the agents. In other words, he needs to give a higher financial rent
to the agents with higher intrinsic motivation to make them reveal their true type. By excluding
some of the agents with lower intrinsic motivation, the principal reduces the informational rents
due to the higher types. If the mission can be determined with the allocation of the project, the
principal has an additional instrument to prevent agents with higher intrinsic motivation from
imitating the agents with lower intrinsic motivation. He can slightly increase the ideological
compromise of the latter. So everything else being equal, in the mechanism with ex-ante fixed
mission the principal needs to exclude a larger number of agents compared to the optimal
mechanism where the project mission can be set ex-post.
More importantly, it can be seen that contrary to the mechanism described in Proposition
1, the optimal project mission in (20) depends on the level of competition, n. The intuition
for this difference is in the amount of information available to the principal at the time in
which he chooses the project mission. In both settings, the effect of competition is to alter
the distribution of the selected types, i.e. the expected intrinsic motivation of the winner is
increasing in n. However, if the project mission can be determined with the allocation of
the project, it can be conditioned on the winner’s type. Therefore, once types are realized,
competition plays no additional role. On the contrary, if the project mission must be fixed
prior to the allocation of the project, the principal, at that point in time, has only information
about the expected value of the winner’s type. So the choice of the project mission is based on
that expected value and the latter is an increasing function of the number of competing agents.
Comparative statics then leads me to the next proposition:
Proposition 4 As competition increases, the project mission gets closer to the agent’s ideal
mission:
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a) limn→2mA −m∗ ≥ limn→∞mA −m∗
b) ∃ n0 such that ∀ n > n0, mA −m∗ is strictly decreasing in n.
c) For the uniform and any power function distribution F (θi), mA −m∗ is strictly decreasing
in n.
Proof. See Appendix.
Competition reduces the ideological compromise of the selected agent, and thus increases
his effort level. The main intuition for Proposition 4 is the following. A higher number of
competitors increases the expected intrinsic motivation of the winner, namely the expected
value of the first order statistic of n independently drawn θi, but increases even more the
expected intrinsic benefit from developing the project of the second lowest bidder, namely the
expected value of the second order statistic of n independently drawn θ2i . The former affects
output, while the latter affects the payment due by the principal to the winner. Thus, roughly
speaking, an increase in n shifts the weight in the principal’s utility function from the valuation
of output to the payment. Therefore, the higher is the level of competition, the higher is
the utility that the principal can derive by saving on payments rather than by increasing his
valuation of output. This can be achieved by moving the ex-ante chosen project mission closer
to the agent’s ideal mission.
Finally, by comparing the expected project mission across the two mechanisms I find the
following:
Proposition 5 Projects whose mission is determined ex-ante lead to a smaller expected ide-
ological compromise of the agents and thus, to a higher expected level of effort, than projects
whose mission is determined with its allocation.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 5 also holds when comparing the optimal scoring-auction with the optimal
(reverse) second price-auction without ceiling price. Thus, the result does not depend on the
exclusion condition. The intuition lies in the degree of competitiveness of the two mechanisms.
When the project mission is fixed ex-ante, the agents are only competing along the price
dimension. On the contrary, in the scoring auction the agents are competing along both the
price and the ideological dimension, and the project mission is the result of competitive forces.
This ideological competition between agents drives up their expected ideological compromise.
It is worth mentioning, however, that even if the agent’s expected effort is higher when the
project mission is fixed ex-ante, the principal is overall better off under the optimal mechanism
described in Section 4. This raises the question of why price-only auctions with ex-ante chosen
project mission are still used in practice to allocate some aid contracts. A reasonable potential
explanation is that a scoring auction entails higher screening costs on the side of the principal,
because a specific score has to be assigned to the mission dimension of each applicant’s proposal,
whereas under a price auction with ex-ante fixed mission, the principal only has to check that
each proposal satisfies the conditions specified in the contract. Therefore, even if the principal
gets an informational advantage by letting the mission be determined with the allocation of
the project rather than fixing it ex-ante, as the number of competing agent increases, there is
less uncertainty about the value of the intrinsic motivation of the winner, so this informational
advantage decreases.
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In the extreme case with n→∞, the principal knows with certainty the intrinsic motivation
of the winner, so the optimal project mission will be the same whether it is set prior to, or
with, the allocation of the project. In other words, if n is sufficiently large, the optimal scoring
auction and the optimal price auction yield the same expected utility to the principal. It follows
that if the principal expects a large number of applicants, the expected loss in utility of fixing
the project mission ex-ante can be lower than the expected savings in screening costs, making
the price competition more appealing than the scoring auction. This is all the more true, the
lower is θD, that is, the lower is the weight that the principal assigns to output compared to
the price. If θD is low, the principal mainly cares about lowering the price he has to pay for the
project rather than about output. So in the presence of screening costs and high competition, it
may not be worth running a scoring auction. Consistent with the stylized facts described below,
this applies particularly well to the social goods that are covered by supply and work contracts
(e.g. rental and hire products, building projects), whose implementation is, by nature, not very
sensitive to ideological values. So the principal will mainly try to reduce the payment.17
2.4.1. Stylized facts and theoretical predictions
Contrary to social service contracts, supply and work contracts in the aid sector are allocated
through a standard price competition, with ex-ante fixed project mission.18 In practice, fixing
the project mission ex-ante is equivalent to specifying, in the TOR, a minimum set of conditions
on the project’s design that ought to be satisfied. Therefore, the conformity of the applicants’
proposal to these conditions is only made on a YES/NO basis. No score is assigned. Only
those applicants that satisfy a sufficient number of conditions will be allowed to bid for a price.
Among those, the applicant that bid the lowest price is awarded the contract.19
The findings described in this section generates a number of testable predictions regarding
the design of competitive tenders in the aid context:
Prediction 1 In tenders that allocate the procurement contract to the lowest bidder (price-only
competition), there is a negative correlation between the number of competitors (in particular
the number of non-profits) and the number of conditions in the TOR description that must be
satisfied by the winner.
What is not specified in the TOR is left to the discretion of the agent. So moving the project
mission closer to the agent’s ideal mission translates into imposing fewer conditions in the TOR
description. Thus, Proposition 4 suggests that under the optimal price-auction an increase in
the expected number of competitors, by increasing the expected intrinsic benefit of developing
project of the second lowest bidder, makes it optimal for the principal to impose fewer conditions
on the project’s design. By taking into account the further distinction between non-profits and
for-profits, an expected increase in the relative participation of the former should also lead to an
increase in the expected intrinsic benefit of the second lowest bidder. So Prediction 1 follows.
17Indeed, the rental and hire of products or the procurement of a building project are less likely to involve
strong mission preferences compared to the provision of social services, such as educational, health, or research
projects.
18EuropeAid defines supply contracts those contracts that cover purchase, leasing, rental or hire of products.
Work contracts cover the procurement of building or civil engineering projects.
19For more details see the Practical guide to contract procedures for European Union external actions.
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Prediction 2 The number of conditions listed in the TOR that must be satisfied by the winner
is on average higher in those procurement contracts that are allocated through a scoring auction
rather than through a price-only auction.
This prediction follows from Proposition 5, which suggests that on average the project mission
is closer to the agent’s ideal mission in price-only competitions rather than in competitions
based on both price and mission.
2.5. Optimal Contract with Budget Constraints
I now study the same optimal contracting problem, but in the presence of budget constraints.
In this setting, the principal’s payment represents the budget available to the agent to develop
the project, and the agent’s effort must now be interpreted as the agent’s ex-post monetary
investment in the project. There are, indeed, many natural situations in which a principal
allocates a budget to an agent with expertise, who should then invest it in the public project.
As contracts are incomplete, the amount of the budget that the agent will actually invest - rather
than keep for personal consumption or waste - depends on the agent’s intrinsic motivation and
on the alignment between the project mission and his ideal mission. This extension is meant to
capture, in particular, the contracting of public projects that are highly capital intensive, and
where the agent has the expertise to make the investment but is not expected to financially
contribute to the project. This is the case, for instance, in scientific and medical research
projects or when the agent is an NGO with no access to independent resources.
Given the complexity of the analysis, I now assume that the principal faces only one agent
of type θ ∼ F (θ). Furthermore, in order to keep the notation consistent with the rest of the
paper, the model is still written and explained in terms of “effort” rather than “investment”.
But the latter interpretation remains the most appropriate.
Adding a budget constraint to the model has implications on the amount of effort that the
agent can put into the project. This means that the agent cannot exert a level of effort whose
cost is not covered by the principal’s payment. Formally, this implies that
e∗(m, p, θ) = min {θG(mA −m),
√
2p}
The agent exerts the minimum between his optimal unconstrained level of effort - the one he
would choose if he were not budget constrained - and the level of effort he can afford given the
amount of funding received from the principal.
Before turning to the problem under asymmetric information, it is worth mentioning that if
θ were observable by the principal, the optimal contract would imply an ideological compromise
of the agent that is increasing in θ and a payment that is just enough to cover for the optimal
unconstrained level of effort of the agent, i.e. p∗(θ) = θ2G(mA −m(θ))2/2. Indeed, contrary
to Proposition 1, the principal can no longer save on payments by decreasing the agent’s
ideological compromise. As the project mission gets closer to the agent’s ideal mission, the
agent’s effort increases, but so does the payment due by the principal. Thus, the negative
relationship between payment and effort breaks down. The cost of effort is now entirely borne
by the principal. It follows that the level of effort that maximizes the principal’s utility is an
internal solution: the higher is the weight that the principal attributes to output, θD, the higher
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is the level of effort that maximizes his utility. The higher is θ, the smaller is the ideological
compromise that the principal needs to make to induce the agent to reach that level of effort.20
Under asymmetric information about θ, the maximization problem faced by the principal
becomes
max
m(.),p(.)
Eθ
(
θDG(m(θ)−mD)e− p(θ)
)
(22)
subject to
θ ∈ arg max
θˆ∈Θ
U(θˆ, θ) = p(θˆ) + θG(mA −m(θˆ))e∗ − 12e∗2 (23)
U(θ) ≥ 0 (24)
e∗ = min {θG(mA −m(θ)),
√
2p(θ)} (25)
First, notice that in this new setting the participation constraint in (24) is always satisfied
because the principal cannot lower the payment to extract the agent’s intrinsic utility from
exerting effort. Thus, it can be omitted from the analysis. Second, with this new effort func-
tion, the utility functions are no longer separable in payment and the single crossing differences
condition does not automatically hold. Therefore, the problem requires complicated mathe-
matical analysis. For example, when looking at deviations, one should take into account that
the agent could be in a different state compared to the case in which he reports his true type:
the budget constraint might not be binding if the agent reports his type truthfully, but it may
be binding if he reports a different type, and vice versa. Furthermore, the fact that a type
is budget constrained under a specific contract does not imply that also other types will be
budget constrained under that same contract.
The solution to the optimization problem is based on several Lemmas. Below, I provide
an outline of the overall proof by summarizing shortly the main logical steps. I restrict my
attention to contracts in which m(θ) is continuous.
First, I show that there does not exist an implementable mechanism where more than one
type exerts his optimal unconstrained level of effort and for which the budget constraint binds,21
i.e. p(θ) = θ2G(mA−m(θ))2/2. I call the type for which this holds θ. Since type θ = 0 is never
budget constrained, this leaves me with two possible cases: (1) θ = 1, i.e. no agent is budget
constrained; (2) θ ∈ (0, 1), i.e. types in [0, θ] exert their optimal unconstrained level of effort,
while types in [θ, 1] are budget constrained.22 Second, I show that in any interval of types that
are not budget constrained, the strict single crossing differences condition holds. Therefore, in
such intervals, mA−m∗(θ) must be non-increasing in θ. This applies to the full interval of types
when θ = 1, and in the interval [0, θ] when θ ∈ (0, 1). Third, I show that there always exists
a pooling contract that gives the principal a higher utility than any (full or partial) separating
20This relies on the assumption that θDG(0) > θG(mA −mD). That is, if m = mD, the agent under-invests
in effort with respect to the level that maximizes the principal’s utility. If this was not the case, the principal
could set his own preferred mission and pay the agent just enough to allow him to exert the amount of effort
that maximizes his utility.
21This also shows that the full information optimum with budget constraints is not implementable.
22It is indeed straightforward to show that under the optimal mechanism all types cannot be budget con-
strained. For more details see case θ → 0 in the Appendix.
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contract with decreasing mA−m∗(θ). This holds for both θ = 1 and θ ∈ (0, 1). Finally, I show
that there exists no implementable mechanism in which mA −m∗(θ) is increasing in θ in the
interval of types that are budget constrained. That is, I rule out that mA − m∗(θ) might be
U-shaped when θ ∈ (0, 1). This proves that the optimal mechanism must be a pooling contract.
Proposition 6 follows:
Proposition 6 The optimal mechanism is a pooling contract where (1) an agent with intrinsic
motivation lower than θ receives a financial rent and exerts his optimal unconstrained level of
effort; (2) an agent with intrinsic motivation higher than θ is budget constrained and receives
no financial rents; (3) θ > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
In the presence of budget constraints, it is not optimal for the principal to screen the agent
by offering a menu of contracts with different payments and project’s missions. The intuition
for this result is as follows: in the agent’s utility function, the weight assigned to the project
mission relatively to the financial payment is increasing in the agent’s intrinsic motivation.
Therefore, in order to screen the agent, the principal should offer to compensate higher types
with a lower ideological compromise and lower types with a higher financial payment. However,
the extent to which higher types can derive an intrinsic benefit from a project mission being
close to their ideal mission depends on the amount of effort they are able to exert. Because
of the budget constraints, the latter is bound to the payment. More specifically, the payment
made by the principal acts as an upper bound for the level of effort that the agent can exert.
This implies that the ideological and the financial compensation are complements rather than
substitutes. For instance, a contract that specifies a low payment and a mission equal to the
agent’s ideal mission will still yield a low utility to a high type because the amount of effort
that the latter can put into the project remains low. It follows that a separating equilibrium,
to be implementable, requires low types to receive very high financial rents. As shown in the
Appendix, this turns out not to be optimal for the principal. Proposition 6 suggests, moreover,
that under the optimal pooling contract at least some agents with higher intrinsic motivations
will always be budget constrained. This is to avoid the financial rent of the low motivated
agents to be too high.
To see that the optimal mechanism would exhibit some pooling even in the presence of
multiple agents, consider the participation and the incentive compatibility constraints of the
lowest type, θi = 0. While in the benchmark model the participation constraint of the lowest
type can be set to bind, leading to an incentive compatible probability of winning the contract
equal to zero, in the presence of budget constraints the lowest type always derives some positive
utility from winning the contract. This holds because, as explained above, the participation
constraint in (24) slacks by definition, i.e. payments must be strictly positive. It follows that
under any implementable mechanism, the lowest type must have a strictly positive probability
of winning the contract. If this was not the case, the latter would be better off by imitating a
higher type in order to receive a positive payment with a non-zero probability.
While a formal solution is derived for one agent only, this result still provides some intuition
for why, calls for research grants may not take the exact form of scoring auctions with predefined
scoring rules, but exhibit some characteristics similar to pooling contracts where the amount of
funding that is awarded does not result endogenously from a bidding process but is, to a large
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extent, fixed ex-ante.
2.6. Conclusion and discussion
The paper makes several contributions. First, the paper contributes to the theoretical literature
on optimal contracting with motivated agents by analyzing, for the first time, a mechanism
design problem where the agents vary in their unobservable intrinsic motivation levels and
are incentivized not by outcome-contingent rewards, but by the choice of the project mission.
Contrary to previous studies, the agents’ intrinsic benefit from developing a project is partly
endogenous and dependent on the project mission.
Second, the paper contributes to the theoretical literature on delegation by identifying a
new channel that can affect the delegation of a relevant decision from a principal to an agent.
More precisely, in the model presented in this paper the principal’s delegation of the choice
of a project mission to an agent is lower than the socially optimal level because the principal
cannot observe the agents’ intrinsic motivation.
Third, the analysis provides policy recommendations to governments, international orga-
nizations and private foundations who pursue specific missions, on how to optimally design
a competition for the allocation of a project. In particular, the analysis suggests that (1) in
the absence of practical impediments, the project is best allocated through a scoring auction
whose scoring rule assigns a higher weight to the mission dimension relatively to the procurer’s
true preference; (2) in price-only auctions, the higher is the expected number of applicants,
the fewer conditions should be imposed in the project mission; (3) in the presence of budget
constraints, less competitive mechanisms, e.g. posted grant with pre-determined amount of
funding, direct negotiations or direct allocations to regular partners, may be more desirable
than auction tenders to allocate the project.
More generally, the paper provides guidance to managers on how to optimally design com-
pensation packages in situations where the workers care about the mission of their job and
where outcome-contingent rewards are not available. More specifically, the analysis suggests
that managers should offer a menu of contracts with different levels of discretion and payment.
Agents with high intrinsic motivation will then self-select in those contracts that pay less but
offer more discretion on how to solve their tasks or on how to implement their projects. Further-
more, in each of these contracts, the manager should offer a lower level of discretion than the
one he would offer if he could observe the workers’ intrinsic motivation. Finally, in the presence
of budget constraints, the manager may want to offer the same contract to all workers.
Fourth, the paper contributes to the longstanding debate on the desirability of public-private
partnerships for the delivery of social goods by providing insights on whose values are more
likely to dictate the provision of these goods and under which circumstances. As discussed
in Chau and Huysentruyt (2006), one may be worried that public values, such as laicism,
might be undermined by delegating the provision of social services to, for instance, religious
organizations. On the other hand, there is the concern that the state may interfere with non-
profits’ goals and values, as the dependence on public funds is likely to make the non-profits
vulnerable to political pressures. This paper shows that non-profits’ missions are more likely to
be compromised in the presence of informational asymmetries about the intrinsic motivation
of their workers, when contracts are allocated through scoring auctions, and when competition
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within a price-only auction is low.
The model can be extended further in several ways. First, this paper focuses on a mechanism
design problem where the agents vary in how much they value the mission dimension compared
to the financial dimension when contracting the development of a project. An alternative
approach would be to vary, instead, the distance between the agents’ ideal missions and the
principal’s ideal mission. It is indeed plausible to assume that the mission preferences of
some agents may be more aligned with the principal’s ideal mission than others. Second, the
present analysis presumes that monetary incentives to induce agent’s effort are not available
or desirable, for reasons outside the model. Such assumption could be relaxed to investigate
situations where the principal has two instruments to motivate effort provision: a monetary
incentive scheme that appeals to the agents’ extrinsic motivation and the choice of the project
mission that appeals to the agents’ intrinsic motivation. Finally, the model generates a series
of new theoretical predictions regarding the design of competitive tenders for the provision of
social goods that are worth testing empirically. Given the relevant endogeneity issues present
in field data, experimental data could provide valuable complementary evidence. All these
extensions are left for future work.
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Chapter 3
Job Mission as a Substitute for
Monetary Incentives: Experimental
Evidence
The design of incentives in organizations has always been at the core of economists’ research
agendas, motivating a large body of the empirical and theoretical literature. To date, however,
most of the economic studies have focused on the design of financial incentives, such as pay-
for-performance contracts and bonus awards. While these incentives can be a powerful tool
in firms where employees’ primary goal is to earn money, they may become less effective—or
even harmful (Benabou and Tirole, 2003)—in organizations where workers perform tasks that
have positive externalities for society, e.g. in organizations involved in the provision of social
goods and services. Workers in these organizations are often driven only partly by financial
rewards, but also by the mission of their job, i.e., by the overall job design and characteristics
and its impact on society. This raises the question of whether principals use the job mission
as a substitute for monetary incentives in eliciting effort from motivated agents. This is the
central question of this paper.
The answer to this question has implications for a wide set of labor market environments,
for instance, for the design of contracts in organizations that are involved in the provision
of social goods and services. Given that many of these organizations do not generate profit
and, therefore, have limited financial resources at their disposal, non-monetary incentives can
play a major role in motivating employees, while, at the same time, reducing the organization’s
financial expenses. If employees care about the mission of their projects, it may be desirable for
an employer to increase the employees’ discretion in designing their own projects even though
their mission preferences may not be perfectly aligned. For example, employees of a non-profit
organization in the field of education may be willing to exert the same level of effort for a lower
wage in order to be able to choose the characteristics of the project on which they work: the
educational curricula that should be taught, the teaching methods that should be used, the
beneficiaries’ targeting, and so on. Such “ideological” issues play an important role in the social
and development sector (Besley and Ghatak, 1999, 2001).
More generally, this analysis has implication for the design of contracts in organizations
where employees solve tasks that involve a certain level of creativity. Motivated journalists,
researchers, architects, and computer engineers, can feel very strongly about the products
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they develop and may be willing to give up financial gains in order to decide which news to
cover, which research topics to address, which phone applications to design. Do firms and
organizations such as the New York Times, the World Bank and Apple, take advantage of
this intrinsic motivation when designing their contracts? Google seems to understand how to
make the most of its employees’ intrinsic motivation and mission preferences:“... by allowing
its engineers to spend 20% of their work week on projects that interest them, Google is able to
tap into the many talents of its employees.”1
I address the above question in a novel laboratory experiment in which the choice of the
job mission is part of the compensation package that a principal can use to motivate an agent.
A laboratory experiment is an appropriate method to address this issue for several reasons.
First, it allows to perfectly control for self-selection of agents with unobservable characteristics.
For example, while a negative wage differential between the public and the private sector
may be consistent with public organizations substituting mission and job design for monetary
compensations, it may also result from workers with higher abilities self-selecting in the private
sector, or from different production functions across sectors. Second, as it will become clearer
from the design description, since the mission preferences of the principals and of the agents
are not perfectly observable, identification must be achieved by comparing the behavior of the
same individuals in different contexts, namely, by a within-subject design. Third, the effort
task must be monetary in order to compare the agents’ effort choices with the exact predictions
made by different theoretical models. Only laboratory data allow one to perfectly control for
all these issues.
In my experiment, pairs of subjects form principal-agent contractual relationships for the
development of a project. The principal offers the agent a contract, which consists of a mission
and a piece rate, to carry out the project. The agent then chooses a monetary effort level that
generates a profit to the principal and a social output. The social output is implemented as
a donation to a charity, while the choice of the project mission is implemented as the choice
of which charity receives the donation. More specifically, the principal can offer two types
of contracts: an open contract, or a closed contract. If the closed contract is offered, the
effort exerted by the agent generates a donation to the principal’s preferred charity. If the
open contract is offered, the effort exerted by the agent generates a donation to the agent’s
preferred charity.2 The agent is paid according to the piece rate specified in the offered contract.
After receiving the contract, the agent chooses his effort level, which determines payoffs and
donations. Thus, the employer cannot contract directly on effort. He can, however, influence
the agent’s effort level through the choice of the piece rate and through the choice of which of
the two types of contract to offer, namely, the mission.
Notice that the choice of the project mission is only relevant if it entails a trade-off for the
principal, namely, if the principal and the agent prefer different charities. If this wasn’t the
case, the choice between the open and the closed contract would be trivial and the question of
whether the choice of the project mission is treated as substitute to monetary incentives could
not be addressed. Thus, to generate a pool of subjects who care about different charities, in
1http://www.forbes.com/sites/laurahe/2013/03/29/googles-secrets-of-innovation-empowering-its-employees
2It is worth pointing out that differently from Fehr et al. (2013) and Charness et al. (2012), neither contracts
imply a proper delegation of decision from the principal to the agent. The decision is always made by the
principal about whose preferred charity receives the donation. Thus, this paper is not about the intrinsic value
of authority.
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the recruitment process students were informed that they would earn slightly less than usual in
experiments but that they would be given the opportunity to generate a substantial donation
to their favorite charity, which had to be specified in advance.3
In order to identify how agents’ intrinsic motivation and mission preferences affect the
contracts offered by the principals, I need to compare contracts offered to motivated agents with
the contracts that the principals would offer if the agents were not intrinsically motivated and,
therefore, did not care about the project mission. For this purpose, the experiment consisted
of two treatments. In the main treatment, the agents were allowed to choose any desired effort
level for any given piece rate. The parameters of the payoff functions were chosen such that an
agent who is intrinsically motivated and thus cares about the charity, would choose an effort
level that is higher than the piece rate offered in the contract. In the control treatment, the
agents were not allowed to choose more effort than the level that maximizes their monetary
payoff. That is, they could not choose an effort level that is higher than the piece rate specified
in the contract. In this treatment any effort premium from agents’ intrinsic motivation was,
therefore, ruled out. The agents had to behave as if they did not care about the charities.
By comparing the piece rates and the frequency of open contracts offered across the two
treatments, I am able to test whether principals treat monetary incentives and the choice of
the project mission as substitutes to elicit effort from motivated agents. If this is the case,
one should observe agents in the main treatment being offered the open contract more often
and being paid less than agents in the control treatment. That is, in the presence of an effort
premium from agents’ intrinsic motivation, principals should be more likely to let the agents
work for their preferred charity and they should offer lower monetary incentives compared to
situations where this effort premium is absent.
The main results are the following: (i) Agents were motivated to generate a donation under
both contracts, but more so when the donation was made to their preferred charity. In other
words, conditional on the piece rate, in the main treatment effort exerted under the open
contract was higher than under the closed contract, and both these efforts were higher than the
effort exerted under any contract in the control treatment. This result shows that the mission
of a job matters for motivated workers: the higher the mission-matching, the higher the effort
level. (ii) Given a type of contract, open or closed, the piece rates were lower in the main
treatment than in the control treatment. Hence, principals took advantage of the agents’ effort
premium in the main treatment by offering lower monetary incentives. (iii) The open contract
was offered more frequently in the main treatment than in the control treatment. Thus, if
faced with motivated agents who can act on their motivation, principals were more willing to
compromise on the job mission to save on monetary incentives.
These results are further supported when matching subjects’ decisions in the experiment
with their choices from an allocation game, which was run at the end of the experiment to
measure the charity preferences at an individual level. More specifically, I find that the results
apply mainly to those subjects who, according to their decisions in the allocation game, have
a stronger preference for their chosen charity compared to other charities.
Viewed jointly, these findings provide evidence that principals treat the choice of the job
3This recruitment procedure has, of course, generated a selected pool of subjects. This selection is, however,
necessary because the underlying theory is about employers and workers who care about the mission of the
project. The design is meant to reflect the environment of mission-oriented organizations rather than purely
profit-driven firms.
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mission as a substitute for monetary incentives, in order to elicit effort from motivated agents.
In the experiment, this resulted in the same realized level of effort across treatments but with
different combinations of incentives. That is, in the main treatment, principals were able to
replace monetary incentives with non-monetary incentives and still induce the same level of
effort as in the control treatment.
I also find, however, that principals were heterogenous in their willingness to substitute
monetary with non-monetary incentives. This heterogeneity was driven by fairness consid-
erations. I find that the high number of principals who, in a postexperiment questionnaire,
reported some fairness concerns about offering a lower wage to a motivated worker, sacrificed
profits because they were reluctant to lower the piece rate below a fair threshold. Thus, these
fairness concerns acted as a limited liability constraint, making the substitution between the
mission and the piece rate imperfect.
The findings of this paper contribute not only to the design of incentives in organizations,
but also to our understanding of job satisfaction and wage differentials across organizations
and sectors. They may help explain, for instance, why firms such as Google may be able to
pay lower wages than their main competitor without becoming any less attractive to talented
employees.4 They may also explain why workers in mission-oriented sectors, such as welfare
and religious services, are paid the lowest wage, but report the highest job satisfaction, across
all sectors Pischke (2011). The results of this paper suggest that this is likely not driven only
by self-selection of happy workers into these industries, but also by specific non-monetary job
attributes in these sectors which substitute for low income.
The paper relates to several strands of literature. First, it relates to contract theory models
with motivated agents (Besley and Ghatak, 2005; Delfgaauw and Dur, 2007; Cassar, 2014b). In
a setting where the job mission is exogenous, Besley and Ghatak (2005) show that it is optimal
for a principal to offer lower monetary incentives if he is matched with an agent who shares
his same mission preferences. Similarly, Delfgaauw and Dur (2007) shows that more motivated
workers imply weaker monetary incentives. In a setting where the choice of a project mission is
endogenous and where the principal and the agent have misaligned mission preferences, Cassar
(2014b) shows that it is optimal for the principal to (partly) compromise on the choice of the
mission in order to save on financial payments. Thus, overall, the findings of this paper provide
experimental support for the predictions of these models. Second, the paper relates to previous
experimental studies that show that the matching of the job mission with the workers’ preferred
mission increases effort (Carpenter and Gong, 2013; Gerhards, 2013; Fehrler and Kosfeld, 2013;
Besley and Ghatak, 2013; Tonin and Vlassopoulos, 2014). These studies, however, only focus
on the behavior of the agents, and do not address the main question of this paper.5 Finally,
4Circumstantial evidence reported in the New York Times suggests that:“...Google pays less and its health
insurance is not as good as Microsoft.” Source: http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/06/28/google-v-microsoft-
whats-the-better-workplace. Taking a more extreme example, these results provide also an explanation for the
recent empirical evidence in Bahney et al. (2013), which shows that insurgent fighters by Al Qa’ida Iraq are
paid less than their outside options, even when compared to unskilled labor, and receive an estimated negative
risk premium.
5Gerhards (2013) also analyzes the principals’ choice and finds that principals pay higher piece rates in
contracts with the agents’ preferred mission than in contracts with a random mission. However, given that in
the design by Gerhards (2013) principals often share the same mission preference as the agents, this may simply
be the result of the employers wanting to elicit more effort for their preferred mission than for a random mission.
Finally, (Nyborg and Zhang, 2013; Nyborg, 2014) shows that firms with a reputation as socially responsible
pay significantly lower wages. These studies, however, only report correlations and cannot make any causal
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the paper points to a different “hidden cost of control” which, contrary to Falk and Kosfeld
(2006) and Bartling et al. (2012, 2013), does not arise from the perception that the lack of
discretion is a signal of the principal’s distrust, but from the fact that motivated workers have
direct preferences on how to solve their tasks, and these preferences are not always aligned with
the ones of their employers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the theo-
retical framework and predictions. Section 3.2 describes the experimental design. Section 3.3
presents the results. Section 3.4 discuss some results in more details. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.1. Theoretical Framework
3.1.1. The model
The theoretical basis for my experimental design is a simple extension, which I describe below,
of the model by Besley and Ghatak (2005) to an environment where the project’s mission is
endogenous and where the principal and the agent have different mission preferences.
An agent is matched with a principal who offers him a contract for the development of a
social project. The contract specifies a wage per unit of effort w , henceforth piece rate, and
a project’s mission m ∈ {mP ,mA}, where mP is the preferred mission of the principal, mA is
the preferred mission of the agent, and mP 6= mA. The agent will then exert a level of effort,
e, to develop the project. The utility of the principal from implementing the contract (w,m)
is equal to
V (e;w,m) = Π(e, w) + γmD(e) m = mA,mP (1)
Π(e) is the profit generated by the project as a function of the agent’s effort. This is composed
of the monetary output minus the piece rate cost. γm is the principal’s valuation for the social
output of a project with mission m, and D(e) is the social output generated by the project as
a function of the agent’s effort. It follows that γmP > γmA ≥ 0, that is, the principal values
more the social output of a project with his preferred mission than with the preferred mission
of the agent. The principal chooses (w,m) that maximizes (1). Given the contract (w,m), the
agent chooses the level of effort that maximizes the following utility:
U(w,m; e) = we+ αmD(e)− C(e) m = mA,mP (2)
where αm is the agent’s intrinsic motivation to develop a project with mission m and C(e) is
the cost of exerting effort, which is equal to 1
2
e2. It follows that αmA > αmP ≥ 0, that is,
the agent’s intrinsic motivation is higher when he works for his preferred mission than for the
preferred mission of the principal. If the agent were not motivated, he would not care about
the project mission, i.e. αmA = αmP = 0.
6
argument.
6Notice that in principle γmA and αmP could also be negative, that is, the principal and the agent could
derive an intrinsic cost from the social output of a project with mission mA and mP respectively. This could be
the case, for instance, if mission preferences reflect different political or religious views, as in Carpenter and Gong
(2013). This would, however, have no fundamental implication for the theoretical predictions. Nevertheless,
since the experiment involves charities rather than political parties, for an illustrative point of view it is easier
to just assume these parameters to be positive.
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3.1.2. Analysis and theoretical implications
For sake of notational clarity, let’s define wm as the piece rate paid to the agent if the project’s
mission m is chosen. Finally, to keep the analysis simple, Π(.) and D(.) can be assumed to be
linear in effort:
Π(e, w) = (pi − w)e (3)
D(e) = de (4)
The agent’s optimal level of effort is then
e∗m = wm + αmd m = mA,mP (5)
The agent’s optimal level of effort is increasing in the offered piece rate, in the intrinsic motiva-
tion from working in a project with mission m, αm, and in the effort’s productivity in generating
social output, d. Since αmA > αmP , motivated agents exert more effort, for any given piece
rate, in contracts with their preferred mission. Furthermore, this level of effort is higher than
the piece rate. If an agent is not motivated, his optimal level of effort is equal to the piece rate
independently of the project mission. This leads to the following prediction:
Prediction 3 The effort premium from agents’ intrinsic motivation is higher when the agents
work for their preferred mission than for the preferred mission of the principals.
Given the optimal level of effort in (5), the optimal piece rate in a contract with mission m
is equal to
w∗m = Max
{
0 ; 1
2
[pi + d(γm − αm)]
}
m = mA,mP (6)
The optimal piece rate is increasing in the effort’s productivity in generating profit, pi and in
the principal’s valuation of the social output of a project with mission m, γm. This is the
preference channel : everything else being equal, the more the principal cares about the social
output of a project, the higher the effort level he wants to elicit from the agent, and in turn,
the higher the piece rate he will offer in the contract. More importantly for this study, the
optimal piece rate is decreasing in the agent’s intrinsic motivation to work for a project with
mission m, αm. This is the substitution channel : everything else being equal, the higher the
agent’s intrinsic motivation, the more the principal can save on monetary incentives, i.e., the
more he can lower the piece rate. The experiment is designed to identify this channel.
These two channels have three implications for contract design. First, since the preference
channel is stronger under the contract with the principal’s preferred mission (γmP > γmA) while
the opposite holds true for the substitution channel (αmA > αmP ), wages are higher in contracts
with the principal’s preferred mission, i.e. w∗mP > w
∗
mA
. This leads to a negative correlation
between financial incentives and the alignment of the project mission with the agent’s mission
preferences. Second, because of the substitution channel, motivated agents are offered lower
wages compared to non-motivated agents. If αmP > 0, this is true for both project missions.
Third, this piece rate differential should be higher if the motivated agent works for his preferred
mission, as the substitution channel is stronger in this case. In other words, the principal can
take more advantage of the agent’s intrinsic motivation by lowering the piece rate when the
latter works for his preferred mission. This generates the following prediction(s):
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Prediction 4 i) Wages are higher in contracts with the principals’ preferred mission; ii) Mo-
tivated agents are paid less than non-motivated agents; iii) The piece rate differential in ii is
higher if motivated agents work for their preferred mission than for the preferred mission of the
principals.
By replacing the optimal piece rate in the optimal effort function of the agent, I can derive
the optimal level of effort as a function of the exogenous parameters only:
e∗m =
1
2
[pi + d(γm + αm)] m = mA,mP (7)
Equation (7) suggests that for any project mission, the unconditional level of effort is increasing
in both the principal’s valuation for social output and the agent’s intrinsic motivation. Com-
parative statics depend on the specific values taken by γm and αm. Since these parameters
can take any value, I cannot predict whether the unconditional level of effort will be higher
under the contract with the principal’s preferred mission or under the contract with the agent’s
preferred mission. For sufficiently high αmA , however, it is clear that the level of effort will be
higher under the contract with the agent’s preferred mission. Since wages are lower under such
contracts, this can result in a negative correlation between effort and monetary incentive in a
cross-section of organizations.
Finally, I can derive the principal’s utility from each of the two contracts to make predictions
about the optimal choice of the project’s mission. Equation (1) can be rewritten as
V (e∗;w∗,m) = (pi − w∗m)e∗m + γmde∗m m = mA,mP
Replacing the optimal level of effort and the optimal piece rate gives
V (m) =
1
4
[pi + d(γm + αm)]
2 m = mA,mP (8)
As for the unconditional level of effort, the principal’s utility from the contract with project’s
mission m is increasing in both the principal’s valuation for social output and the agent’s
intrinsic motivation for mission m. Which project’s mission maximizes the principal’s utility
depends on the specific value taken by γm and αm, ∀ m = mA,mP . Notice, however, that
the higher is the difference between αmA and αmP , that is, the stronger the agent feels about
his preferred mission, the more likely is V (mA) to be higher than V (mD) and, therefore, the
more likely should be the principal to let the agent work for his preferred mission. Now, in the
extreme case where αmA = αmP , i.e. the agent is indifferent about the missions or the agent
is not-motivated, the principal is undoubtedly better off by choosing his preferred mission, i.e.
m∗ = mP . Indeed, if the principal cannot take advantage of the substitution channel, there is
no reason why the principal should make a compromise on the mission. Therefore, compared
to a situation where the agent is not intrinsically motivated, if the agent is motivated the
principal should be more likely to offer the contract with the agent’s preferred mission.7 The
last prediction follows:
Prediction 5 Principals should be more likely to compromise on the mission the more the
agents are motivated.
Thus, all together, these predictions 4-5 imply that motivated agents should be compensated
with higher non-monetary incentives and lower monetary incentives than non-motivated agents.
7In a setting where m is continuous, the model would predict that the higher the agent’s intrinsic motivation,
the larger the compromise that the principal would make on the project mission (Cassar, 2014b).
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3.2. The Experiment
The design of the experiment closely follows the theoretical framework described in Section
3.1. The social output generated by the project is implemented as a donation to a charity that
subjects can generate in addition to their monetary payoffs. The choice of the project’s mission
is implemented as the choice of which charity receives the donation. My identification strategy
of the causal effect of the agents’ intrinsic motivation on the choice of the piece rate and of the
project mission is the comparison between the contracts offered to motivated agents and the
contracts offered if the agents were constrained to behave as if they were not motivated. To do
so, I run the two treatments described in Section 3.2.3.
3.2.1. Recruitment
The implementation described above only works if subjects care about different charities. If this
were not the case, the choice of the project mission, i.e. the choice of which charity receives the
donation, would not entail any trade-off for the principal. Thus, the question whether the choice
of the project mission is treated as substitute to monetary incentives could not be addressed.
To generate such pool of subjects, in the recruitment process students were informed that they
may earn slightly less than usual in experiments but that they would be given the opportunity
to generate a substantial donation to their favorite charity. Furthermore, in order to sign up,
subjects had to specify the name and the website of their favorite charity. This recruitment
procedure turned out to be successful as 92 different charities were chosen by 146 subjects. As
soon as the subjects arrived in the laboratory, they received a list of all the charities that were
chosen by subjects participating in the same experimental session. The list also specified the
number of subjects choosing the same charity. Therefore, subjects knew the full distribution of
charities choices.
In order to have updated information about subjects’ charity preferences, at the beginning
of the experiment subjects were asked to choose (again) their preferred charity from the list.
Subjects’ specific charity preferences were, however, kept confidential throughout the experi-
ment. In other words, subjects knew that all the preferred charities of other subjects must be
in the list but, when interacting with another subject, they did not know which specific charity
in the list that other subject had chosen. As it will become clearer in the next section, this
design choice had several advantages, including avoiding the risk, ex-ante, of matching subjects
with preferences for the same charity.
3.2.2. Experimental design
After the instructions were read aloud, half of the subjects were assigned to the role of principals,
the other half the role of agents. The same role was kept throughout the experiment, which
consisted of multiple periods. At the beginning of each period, every agent was randomly and
anonymously re-matched to a principal.
In each period, the sequence of actions was as follows. The principal chose a piece rate w
in the integer set {1, 2, .., 9}, and whether to offer a closed or an open contract. If the closed
contract was offered, the effort exerted by the agent generated, in addition to the principal’s
profit, a donation to the principal’s preferred charity. If the open contract was offered, the
effort exerted by the agent generated, in addition to the principal’s profit, a donation to the
32
agent’s preferred charity. Thus, in terms of the model described in Section 3.1, the closed
contract corresponds to the choice of a project mission equal to mP , while the open contract
corresponds to the choice of a project mission equal mA.
The agent then chose a costly level of effort e in the integer set {1, 2, .., 9} which determined
payoffs and donations in that period. To rule out binding budget constraints, at the beginning
of each period every agent was endowed with 35 points. This allowed the agent to exert the
maximum level of effort even if the principal chose a piece rate of 1. Both the principal’s profit
and the level of donation depended linearly on effort as in (3) and (4). Specifically, pi = 10
and d = 20. This choice of parameters, along with the convex effort function, ensured that it
was not convenient neither for the principal nor for the agent to maximize own income and
donate later. Finally, at the beginning of each period a base income of 20 points was given to
every principal in order to get roughly the same monetary payoffs under the optimal choices
for agents and principals who did not care about charities, i.e. for e = w = 5 in both contracts.
As subjects may vary in the extent to which they care about the charities and this is not
observable, the strategy method was necessary to elicit the principal’s choice of piece rate and
the agent’s choice of effort for both the closed and open contract. More specifically, I elicited
the agent’s effort choice for each possible piece rate in each contract. To elicit the principal’s
beliefs about the agent’s effort, the principal also specified an expected level of effort for each
of the two contracts given the chosen piece rate. This elicitation was, however, not incentivized
and the expected effort level was not revealed to the agent. The principal would then choose
which contract, between the open and the closed, to offer to the agent. The chosen contract
was implemented with 75% probability, whereas with 25% probability the other contract was
implemented. This random implementation of contracts was necessary to make the choice of
piece rate incentive compatible even in the principal’s least preferred contract. Furthermore, the
fact that agents did not know with certainty whether the implemented contract corresponded to
the contract chosen by the principal, and that the agents’ effort in each contract was elicited ex-
ante through the strategy method, make it very unlikely that the agents reciprocated principals
who chose to offer the open contract.8 At the end of each period, payoffs realized and became
observable to the principal and the agent. To improve learning, the principal observed not only
the level of effort and the donation realized, but also the level of effort chosen by the agent in
the contract that was not implemented. Similarly, at the end of each period, the agent observed
not only the piece rate offered in the implemented contract, but also the piece rate offered in
the remaining contract. He also observed which of the two contracts the principal had chosen
to offer. Principals and agents were then randomly re-matched.
As pointed out earlier, neither the principals nor the agents were revealed the preferred
charity of the subjects they were matched with. It follows that the principal’s choice between
the closed and the open contract was equivalent to a choice between a contract that generated
a donation to his preferred mission with certainty and a contract that generates a donation to
any of the charity specified in the list with some probability.9 Similarly, an agent knew that
8Reciprocity towards the choice of the open contract would have, indeed, the same implications as an increase
in αmA , so it could have acted as a potential confound. On the contrary, note that reciprocity towards high
wages, by reducing the principal’s benefit from saving on monetary incentives, works against my hypothesis.
Similarly, reciprocity only towards high wages in the open contract leads to the opposite prediction regarding
the optimal choice of wages, namely, the principal may want to set higher wages in the open contract than in
the closed contract.
9This probability was known to the subjects because, as mentioned above, they knew the full distribution of
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his effort level in the closed contract would generate a donation to any charity specified in the
list with a given probability, whereas his effort level in the open contract would generate a
donation to his preferred charity with certainty. Thus, everything else being equal, it is clear
that the principal’s valuation of social output was higher under the closed contract while the
agent’s motivation was higher under the open contract. Theoretical predictions were, therefore,
unchanged.
While this design feature did not affect the theoretical predictions, it had two main advan-
tages. First, this design avoided the risk, ex-ante, of having too many pairs of principal-agent
preferring the same charity. Second, it eliminated any heterogeneity across periods and treat-
ments in the agent’s intrinsic motivation under the closed contract and in the principal’s valua-
tion of output in the open contract. In terms of the model, this was equivalent to keeping αmP
and γmA of each individual constant across periods and treatments. Indeed, such unobservable
heterogeneity across periods and treatments could have added substantial noise to the data and
acted as a potential confound.
3.2.3. Treatments
The experiment involved two treatments. Each subject participated in both treatments. In the
main treatment the agent was free to choose any desired level of effort. As shown in equation
(5), if the agent cared about the charity he would choose an effort level that is higher than
the piece rate offered in the contract. In the control treatment, the agent was not allowed to
exert more effort than the level that maximized his material payoff. That is, the level of effort
could not be higher than the piece rate specified in the contract. In this treatment any effort
premium from agents’ intrinsic motivation was, therefore, ruled out.
To keep the notation consistent with the theory described in Section 3.1, let wmA and emA
be, respectively, the piece rate and the effort level chosen in the open contract, while let wmP
and emP be, respectively, the piece rate and the effort level chosen in the closed contract.
Treatment variations are summarized in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Treatment variation
Treatment Effort
Main emA ∈ {1, 2.., 9} ; emP ∈ {1, 2.., 9}
Control emA ≤ wmA ; emP ≤ wmP
To ensure that both the principals and the agents understood the payoff implications of
their choices, a payoff table was given in the instructions where, in red, was the effort choice
that maximizes the agent’s income for any given piece rate - thus, the table diagonal was in
red - and, in blue, was the effort choice that maximizes the donation for any given piece rate,
i.e. an effort level of 9 for any given piece rate. Thus, based on this payoff table, it was clear
to both the principals and the agents that if the latter cared about the charity, in the main
treatment they would choose a higher effort level than the piece rate.
charity choices.
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Six sessions were run in total. To control for potential order effects, the order in which
the two treatments were played were systematically modified across sessions. Each treatment
lasted 10 periods. So overall, every subject made decisions for 20 periods. Payments to subjects
and donations to charities were made according to the outcome of one out of the 20 periods
selected at random.
3.2.4. Elicitation of preferences over charities
It is important to point out that subjects are likely to have heterogenous preferences over the
charities. In terms of the model, this means that the agent’s parameters αmA and αmP and
the principal’s parameters γmP and γmA are individual specific. Therefore, to add control and
run robustness checks, it is useful to get an independent measure of these parameters at an
individual level.
For this purpose, I use an allocation game with concave allocation function. At the end of
the experiment, but before the subjects knew which period had been randomly selected to count
for payments and donations, subjects were asked to allocate 40 points between themselves, their
preferred charity, and a charity selected at random from the list. At the time of making the
decision, however, subjects did not know which charity would be randomly selected from the list.
So their information was analogous to the information they had when making decisions during
the experiment. Let’s define pij as the number of points allocated by subject i to a particular
recipient j. To induce non-linearity and avoid corner solutions, we apply the following non-
linear transformation to the payoff of recipient j: Pij = 7 ∗
√
pij. That is, recipient j receives
a payoff of Pij points if subject i allocates pij points to him/her. Since every subject must
allocate all 40 points, it follows that
∑
j pij = 40 ∀i.
According to this allocation function, any subject who cares about his preferred charity, i.e.
any agent with αmA > 0 or any principal with γmP > 0, should allocate some points to his/her
preferred charity. The optimal number of points allocated to the preferred charity is increasing
in αmA , or equivalently in γmP . Similarly, any subject who cares about the charities in the list
as a whole, i.e. any agent with αmP > 0 or any principal with γmA > 0, should allocate some
points to the random charity. The optimal number of points allocated to the random charity
is increasing in αmP for the agents, or equivalently in γmA for the principals.
The advantage of using an allocation game with concave allocation function is that it rules
out potential corner solutions that may arise from efficiency concerns. So this method generates
an approximate measure at an individual level of (i) the intensity with which subjects care
about their preferred charities, i.e. of the size of αmA and γmP ; (ii) the importance of subjects’
preferred mission compared to other missions, i.e. αmA − αmP and γmP − γmA . The latter
measures to what extent a principal, or an agent, is mission-driven and is particularly relevant
for comparative statics across types of contract.
3.2.5. Questionnaire on fairness
Finally, at the end of the experiment subjects answered a very short questionnaire. The pur-
pose of the questionnaire was to elicit subjects’ fairness perceptions about the substitutability
between monetary and non-monetary compensations. Previous survey evidence by Kahneman
et al. (1986) reveals, indeed, that fairness considerations may affect wage-setting decisions.
More specifically, subjects were asked the following two questions: i) “Suppose you run an
organization with two employees: employee A and employee B. These employees are assigned
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the exact same task. Furthermore, they are identical in every aspect: in particular, they have
the same ability and are equally productive. There is only one difference: employee A enjoys
the task more than employee B does. Would you pay them the same wage?” Subjects could
choose between three options: “same wage”, a “higher wage to employee A”, and a “higher
wage to employee B”; ii) “Suppose you run an organization and you are in the process of hiring
a new employee. During the job interview, you realize that the candidate for the position would
really enjoy the job so he/she would accept to do the same amount of work even for a lower
wage than the one you initially planned to offer. Would you offer the candidate a lower wage
than the one you initially planned?” After having answered this question, subjects were asked
whether they thought it was fair to offer a lower wage.
3.2.6. Procedural details
Overall 146 subjects participated in six sessions, 73 in the role of principals and 73 in the role of
agents. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007a). Our subject pool consisted primarily of students at the University of Zurich and at the
Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich and were recruited using the software hroot (Bock
et al., 2012a). Subjects were paid based on the number of points generated in one period
selected at random from the experiment and based on the number of points they allocated
to themselves in the allocation game. Donations to charities were also made accordingly. In
addition, each subject received a show-up fee of 10 SFr. On average, an experimental session
lasted 1 hour and 45 minutes. The average payment was 35 SFr and the average donation was
36 SFr per pair of subjects.
3.2.7. Hypotheses
The analysis of the theoretical model in Section 3.1 generates a set of predictions that I now
restate as hypotheses to be tested in the experiment.
First, the model predicts that conditional on piece rate, the effort premium from agents’
intrinsic motivation is higher in contracts with the agents’ preferred mission. Prediction 3
translates to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 In the main treatment, conditional on piece rate, effort is higher in the open
contract than in the closed contract. Furthermore, effort in the main treatment should be higher
than in the control treatment.
This first hypothesis tests if the project mission is effective in motivating effort provision. Notice
that this hypothesis needs to be satisfied in order to test the remaining hypotheses.
Next, conditional on the hypothesis above being satisfied, the model makes predictions
about the level of piece rate offered by principals. Specifically, it predicts that wages are higher
in contracts with the principals’ preferred mission. Indeed, in such contracts, there is (i) a
stronger preference channel: the principal wants to elicit a higher donation for his preferred
charity than for any other charity; (ii) a weaker substitution channel: the agent needs higher
monetary incentives to provide effort for the principals’ preferred charity than for his own
preferred charity. Prediction 4a translates to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 Wages are higher in the closed contract than in the open contract.
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This second hypothesis tests if, contrary to the results in Gerhards (2013), there is a negative
correlation between financial incentives and the alignment of the project mission with the
agents’ mission preferences. Testing this hypothesis alone, however, can not answer whether
principals take advantage of the agents’ intrinsic motivation by saving on monetary incentives.
To address this question, I need to disentangle the substitution channel from the preference
channel. My identification strategy is to compare the piece rate offered by principals within a
specific type of contract across the two treatments. By comparing wages within the same type of
contract, the preference channel is constant, and therefore, any observed piece rate differential
across treatments must come from the substitution channel: while the substitution channel
should be active in the main treatment, in the control treatment, since the effort premium from
intrinsic motivation is ruled out by design, the substitution channel is switched off. This is
equivalent to Prediction 4b, which translates to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 Conditional on the type of contract, wages are lower in the main treatment than
in the control treatment.
This hypothesis tests if, given a certain project mission, the principal takes advantage of the
agent’s intrinsic motivation to work for that mission by lowering the piece rate. In other words,
this tests if the principal would pay a motivated agent a lower piece rate than a non-motivated
agent.
The size of the substitution channel will depend, of course, on the size of the effort pre-
mium resulting from the agent’s intrinsic motivation in Hypothesis 1. Since I expect the effort
premium to be higher if the agent works for his preferred mission, the next hypothesis follows
from Prediction 4.iii:
Hypothesis 4 The piece rate differential across treatments is higher in the open contract than
in the closed contract.
Finally, the model makes predictions about the principal’s choice of the project’s mission.
More specifically, if the agent is not motivated, the principal has no reason to choose a different
mission from his preferred one. On the contrary, if the agent is motivated, the principal may
want to compromise on the mission in order to save on monetary incentives. The next hypothesis
follows from Prediction 5:
Hypothesis 5 The principal is more likely to offer the open contract in the main treatment
than in the control treatment.
Hypotheses 3-5 together test if the principal treats the choice of the project mission as a
substitute for monetary incentives in motivating effort provision.
3.3. Results
I start by describing the results from the allocation game to test whether the recruitment
process was successful in generating the right pool of subjects. These results will also be used
for robustness checks in the subsequent analyses. I then report the agents’ effort choices. Indeed,
in order to address the central question of this paper, it is necessary to find the predicted effort
differences across contracts and treatments. Finally, I turn to the central part of this paper,
namely, to the principals’ choices of piece rates and contracts.
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3.3.1. Descriptive statistics from the allocation game
The results from the allocation game are illustrated in Figure 3.1. Recall that the subjects
had to allocate 40 points between themselves, their preferred charity, and one charity in the
list selected at random. The figure shows the number of points allocated by subjects to their
preferred charity and to the random charity in the list. By subtracting these numbers from
the 40 points endowment, one can infer how many points subjects kept for themselves. Circles
below (above) the 45-degree line indicate higher (lower) number of points allocated to one’s
preferred charity compared to the random charity. Circles below (above) the line y = 20 − x
indicate higher (lower) number of points allocated to oneself compared to both the charities.
The size of the circles reflect the number of observations. The biggest circle represents 16
observations while the smallest circle represents one observation.
As can be seen, with the exception of one subject, all other subjects allocated equal or more
points to their preferred charity than to the random charity in the list. Furthermore, only a
minority of subjects, approximately 11 percent, acted as a pure profit maximizers by keeping
all the money for themselves. Roughly a fifth of the subjects seemed to be indifferent between
all charities in the list.
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Figure 3.1: Allocation Choices
While this is only an approximation of subjects’ preferences over charities, and taking into
account that these preferences were elicited only at the end of experiment, it still provides some
informative evidence that, overall: i) Subjects cared about the charities; ii) The charities were
not perfect substitutes, but subjects strictly preferred their chosen charity. Thus, the recruit-
ment process was successful in generating the right pool of subjects to address the questions of
this paper.
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3.3.2. Agents’ effort choices
I start by analyzing the agents’ effort choices for different wages and contracts in the two
treatments. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, I find:
Result 1 Within the main treatment, effort is higher in the open contract than in the closed
contract. And for both types of contract, effort in the main treatment is higher than in the
control treatment.
Evidence for Result 1 can be seen in Figure 3.2. This figure shows the effort choices per piece
rate and type of contract elicited through the strategy method in each treatment. The black
line represents the 45 degrees line. Thus, any point on the right of the black line corresponds
to a (positive) effort premium from intrinsic motivation.
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Figure 3.2: Effort Choices
As predicted, because of the imposed restriction on the agents’ choice set, in the control
treatment the average effort in both contracts is equal or slightly lower than the piece rate.
On the contrary, in the main treatment average effort in both contracts is always higher than
the piece rate - with the obvious exception for a piece rate equal to 9. Furthermore, within
the main treatment, for any given piece rate average effort is roughly half unit higher in the
open contract than in the closed contract. To assess the statistical significance of these effort
differences, I use the one-sided clustered version of the signed-rank test proposed by Datta
and Satten (2008), which controls for potential dependencies between observations. Within
the main treatment, for each given piece rate, individual and period, I calculate the difference
between the effort choice in the open contract and in the closed contract. This generates 10
observations per subject, per piece rate. Clustering at the individual level, I find that for any
piece rate level, the effort choice in the open contract is significantly higher than in the closed
contract (p < 0.01). Using the same test to assess the statistical significance of the effort
differences across treatments, I find that for any piece rate level in a specific type of contract,
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the effort choice in the main treatment is significantly higher than the effort choice in the control
treatment - and also higher than the piece rate (p < 0.01). This holds for both the open and
the closed contract.10
Table 3.2: Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
effort piece rate open contract beliefs effort
piece rate 0.942*** 0.686***
(0.014) (0.050)
piece rate*open –0.014 –0.053
(0.008) (0.035)
open contract 0.179*** –0.755*** 0.137
(0.046) (0.156) (0.224)
main treatment 0.510*** –0.684*** 0.116*** 0.309***
(0.109) (0.131) (0.029) (0.091)
main*open 0.422*** 0.056 0.703***
(0.083) (0.149) (0.118)
constant 0.041 6.041*** 0.298*** 1.520***
(0.088) (0.152) (0.042) (0.299)
Round FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Session FE? No No No No
Individual FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.878 0.125 0.024 0.468
Observations 26280 2920 1460 2920
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. All regressions use a fixed-effect model. The dependent
variables in regression (1), (2), (3), (4) are, respectively, the agent’s effort level, the principal’s belief about the
agent’s effort level, the piece rate offered by the principal, the type of contract chosen by the principal. More
specifically, in regression (4), the dependent variable equals “1” if principals chooses the open contract and “0”
if the principal chooses the closed. Significance levels: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1.
Similar results are found in the OLS regression, which is reported in Table 3.2. It can
been seen from regression (1) that conditional on piece rate, average effort is 0.51 unit points
significantly higher in the main treatment than in the control treatment. Furthermore, as
shown in the interaction of main treatment and open contract, this treatment difference is 0.42
unit points significantly higher in the open contract than in the closed contract. Thus, the
overall effort premium from being matched with a motivated agent who works for his preferred
mission is almost one additional unit of effort.11 Results are robust to using a Tobit model,
to clustering at the session level, or to restricting attention to the first period only, i.e., where
potential spillover effects are fully ruled out.
10Figures A.1-A.9 in the Appendix also report, for any given piece rate, the time path of the effort level chosen
in the open and in the closed contracts across treatments. It can be seen that Result 1 is robust throughout
the time periods and wages - with the exception, of course, for the piece rate equal to 9 where there can’t be
any effort premium from intrinsic motivation.
11Note that if subjects in the control treatment were really non-motivated, the coefficient on the variable
open contract should not be significant, as they would not care about any charity. So this is probably due to a
minority of workers who disliked some charities in the list, and therefore, in the control treatment and closed
contract they chose a level of effort lower than the piece rate. This has no implication for the interpretation of
the results, because if anything, it should make it harder to find a treatment effect.
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Figure 3.3: Average effort in the main treatment by different agents
Finally, Figure 3.3 uses data from the allocation game to distinguish between the effort levels
chosen by agents with different charity preferences. As Hypothesis 1 relies on the assumption
that agents care more about their chosen charity than about any other charity in the list, i.e.
αmA > αmP , I distinguish between those agents whom I define as mission driven, i.e. those
who, in the allocation game, allocated more points to their preferred charity than to the random
charity, and those who are not mission driven, i.e. who allocated the same number of points,
including 0, to their preferred charity and to the random charity. As can be seen, in the main
treatment, for any given piece rate, the difference in effort levels between the open and the
closed contract is approximately half a unit larger for agents who are mission-driven than for
those who are not. For the latter, this difference almost disappears. Not surprisingly, the
mission of a job is not an effective incentive tool if agents are not motivated or if they don’t
have specific mission preferences.
These results show that, overall, agents were motivated to generate a donation to a charity,
but more so if the donation was directed to their preferred charity rather than to the preferred
charity of the principal.
3.3.3. Principals’ piece rate choices
I now analyze the piece rate offered by principals in different contracts and treatments. Con-
sistent with Hypothesis 2, I find that:
Result 2 Wages are higher in the closed contract than in the open contract.
Evidence for Result 2 can be seen in Figure 3.4. This figure compares the average piece rate
offered across treatments and contracts. It can be seen that in both treatments, the average
piece rate in the closed contract is higher than in the open contract (signed-rank test with
clusters p < 0.01). Notice, furthermore, that this piece rate differential should be higher for
principals who are mission-driven (γmP > γmA) than for those who are not (γmP = γmA).
Indeed, since the latter do not care about the charities, or are indifferent between them, the
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Figure 3.4: Piece rate choices
preference channel will not be higher in the closed contract. Consistent with this argument,
Figure 3.5 shows that the piece rate differential between contracts is approximately 0.6 units
higher for mission-driven principals than for principals who are not mission-driven (rank-sum
test with clusters p < 0.05).
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Figure 3.5: Piece rate choices by different principals
Figure 3.4 also reveals the first main result of this paper. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, I
find:
Result 3 For both types of contract, wages are lower in the main treatment than in the control
treatment.
It can be seen that in both the open and the closed contract, the average piece rate in the control
treatment is approximately 0.7 unit points (or 14 percent) higher than in the main treatment.
Both these differences are highly significant (signed-rank with clusters p < 0.01). Since the
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preference channel is constant within the same type of contract, these piece rate differentials
between treatments identify the substitution channel. Thus, this result shows that principals
take advantage of agents’ intrinsic motivation by lowering the piece rate by approximately 14
percent.12
Another important observation to take from Figure 3.4, however, is that the piece rate
differential between treatments is the same in both types of contract. This is confirmed by
the signed-rank test with clusters. So in others words, in contrast with the theoretical predic-
tions, the substitution channel is not higher in the open contract than in the closed contract.
Hypothesis 4 is, therefore, rejected.
Result 4 There is no difference in the piece rate differential between treatments across the two
contracts.
Similar results are found in regression (3) in Table 3.2. It can be seen that wages in the
open contract are 0.76 unit point significantly lower than in the closed contract. Furthermore,
wages in the main treatment are 0.68 unit point lower than in the control treatment. Both these
differences are highly significant. The interaction between open contract and main treatment
is, however, positive and insignificant. This confirms that the treatment effect is the same in
both contracts. Explanations for this result are discussed in Section 3.4. Again, results are
robust to using a Tobit model, to clustering at the session level, or to restricting attention to
the first period only, where potential spillover effects are fully ruled out.13
3.3.4. Principals’ contract choices
Next, I analyze the principals’ contract choices across treatments. Consistent with Hypothesis
5, I find:
Result 5 The open contract is more frequently offered in the main treatment than in the control
treatment.
Evidence for Result 5 can be see in the left of Figure 3.6. In the main treatment the open
contract is offered approximately 40 percent of the time, whereas in the control treatment the
12One possible alternative interpretation of the result that wages in the open contract are higher in the
main treatment than in control treatment could be that principals care about the agents and do not want to
prevent them from generating a high donation to their favorite charity by setting a low piece rate in the control
treatment. Indeed, recall that the piece rate offered by the principal acts as an upper-bound on the effort that
the agent can exert and, thus, on the donation that can be generated. This interpretation, however, cannot
explain the piece rate difference across treatments that is found in the closed contract, where the donation
is directed to the principal’s preferred charity. Furthermore, if one believes that in the allocation game, the
number of points allocated by a principal to the preferred charity of a subject taken at random is correlated
with how much a principal may care about other subjects - and thus about the agents-, I find that Result 8
does not change when I distinguish between principals who allocated some points to the random charity and
those who did not. The results are available upon request.
13Figure A.10 in the Appendix also reports the time path of the piece rate offered in the open and in the
closed contracts across treatments. It can be seen that throughout all time periods, for both types of contracts,
wages are higher in the main treatment than in the control treatment. Furthermore, within each treatment,
wages are higher in the closed contract than in the open contract.
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Figure 3.6: Contract choices by treatment and different principals
open contract is offered approximately 28 percent of the times.14 This difference is highly
significant (signed-rank test with clusters p < 0.01).
Additional evidence for Result 5 can be found in the regression (4) reported in Table 3.2. It
can be seen that the probability of the open contract being offered is approximately 12 percent
higher in the main treatment than in the control treatment (p < 0.01). The marginal effect
from a Probit model gives the same result.15
Finally, notice that principals who are not mission-driven should be more likely to offer the
open contract than principals who are mission-driven. Indeed, since the formers are indifferent
between the charities, they don’t make any mission compromise by letting the agents generate
a donation to their preferred charity. The right side of Figure 3.6 shows exactly this. Open
contracts are offered 10 percent more frequently by principals who are not mission-driven than
by principals who are mission-driven. However, this difference is not significant (rank-sum test
with clusters p = 0.110).
Results 8 and 5 together provide evidence that principals treat the choice of the project
mission as substitute for monetary incentives. Motivated agents are more likely to work for
their preferred missions and are paid less. This answers the central question of the paper.
3.3.5. Realized effort, piece rate and profit
I now turn my attention to the realized effort and piece rate choices. As it can be seen in Figure
B.12, the average realized effort is approximately equal to 6 in both treatments. This means
that, on average, the same amount of donation was generated across treatments. However,
14Notice that based on the predictions from standard contract theory models, the principal should never offer
the open contract in the control treatment. Indeed, as any effort premium is ruled out by design, there is no
reason to offer the open contract in the control treatment. Thus, this result is probably driven by some of social
preferences of the principals towards the agents.
15Figure A.11 in the Appendix also reports the time path of the contract choice across treatments. It can be
seen that, with the exception of the first period, the frequency of open contracts being offered is always higher
in the main treatment than in the control treatment.
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as it also appears in Figure B.12, the average realized piece rate is approximately 10 percent
lower in the main treatment than in the control treatment. Thus, in the main treatment,
principals were able to replace monetary incentives with non-monetary incentives, i.e., with
letting the agents work for their preferred charities, and still induce the same level of effort as
in the control treatment. As it can be seen in Figure B.13, these financial savings from agents’
intrinsic motivation increases principals’ average profit in the main treatment by approximately
10 percent compared to the control treatment. On the contrary, agents’ average income is
approximately 9 percent lower in the main treatment than in the control treatment.
3.4. Discussion
Result 4 contradicts the theoretical predictions from section 3.1. Surprisingly, the piece rate
differential between treatments is not higher in the open contract than in the closed contract.
However, given that the agents’ intrinsic motivation is higher under the open contract, the
amount that a principal can save in terms of piece rate from being matched with a motivated
agent should be higher under the open contract than under the closed contract. Why is this
not the case?
Based on Figure B.14 in the appendix and regression (4) in Table 3.2, this does not seem
to depend on principals’ erroneous beliefs about agents’ intrinsic motivation, as the formers
correctly anticipate a higher effort premium in the open contract than in the closed contract
for any given piece rate. It can been seen from regression (4) that conditional on the piece
rate, average expected effort is 0.3 unit points significantly higher in the main treatment than
in the control treatment. Furthermore, as suggested by the coefficient of the interaction term,
this treatment difference is 0.7 unit points significantly higher in the open contract than in the
closed contract. So, consistent with the actual agents’ effort choices, the overall expected effort
premium from being matched with a motivated agent who work for his preferred mission is
approximately one additional unit of effort. Hence, principals correctly anticipate that agents’
are intrinsically motivated to generate a donation to a charity, particularly so in the open
contract.
A potential explanation, consistent with the data, is that many principals may be sacrificing
profits in the open contract because they are reluctant to offer a piece rate below what I call
the standard piece rate, that is, the piece rate that a principal would offer if neither him nor the
agent cared about the charities, namely, if γm = αm = 0, i ∈ {A,D}. Given the parameters
chosen in the experiment, this corresponds to a piece rate of 5. Notice, that based on equation
(6), in the main treatment the piece rate offered by the principals in the open contract should
be, on average, lower than the standard piece rate. Indeed, αmA should be, on average, higher
that γmA , and therefore, in the main treatment the average piece rate in the open contract
should be lower than 5.16 Importantly, as it is evident from equation (6), the same predictions
do not hold for the closed contract. The reason is that in such contracts principals are more
motivated than the agents to generate a donation, as the latter is made to their preferred
charity. That is, γmP should be, on average, higher that αmP .
17 Similarly, since in the control
16This is confirmed by the data from the allocation game. On average, agents allocate to their preferred
charity more than twice (10 points) as much as the principals allocate to a random charity in the list (4.3
points).
17This also is confirmed by the data from the allocation game. On average, principals allocate to their
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treatment the substitution channel is switched off, the piece rate should never be lower than 5
in neither type of contracts. Thus, if, as I hypothesize, such fairness constraint exists, it would
only be binding for the open contract in the main treatment, but not in the closed contract nor
in the control treatment.
Consistent with this argument, as shown in Figure 3.4, in the control treatment or in the
closed contract, the average piece rate is significantly higher than 5, whereas in the open contract
in the main treatment the average piece rate is just equal to 5. A similar picture emerges if we
look at the distribution of wages chosen in different treatments and contracts (Figure B.15).
While the frequency of wages below 5 in the open contract in the main treatment (30 percent)
is significantly higher than in the closed contract (17 percent) or than in the control treatment
(11 percent), it is still quite low compared to the theoretical predictions. I, therefore, conjecture
that principals are reluctant to set a piece rate below the standard piece rate.
Taking this conjecture as given, the next question is why are the principals reluctant to set
a piece rate below the standard piece rate. Inequity aversion as defined in Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) does not seem to be the reason because, given the parameters chosen in the experiment,
inequity averse principals would prefer wages that are equal or lower than the standard piece
rate, but not higher. Neither is there evidence, from Figure 3.2 or Figure B.14, of negative
reciprocity nor of expected negative reciprocity by principals with respect to wages below the
standard piece rate in the open contract.18
Such reluctance seems related to a different fairness standard: offering a piece rate below
the standard piece rate is a clear sign of exploiting workers’ intrinsic motivation, and therefore,
many principals who consider this to be unfair are more reluctant to lower the piece rate beyond
that level. Subjects’ responses to a survey conducted at the end of the experimental study are
consistent with this argument. When asked if, in the role of employers during a job interview,
they would offer a lower piece rate than the one they initially thought to offer if they realized
that the job candidate would really enjoy doing this job, only 22 subjects replied they would
offer a lower piece rate, while 124 subjects replied they would not offer a lower piece rate, most
of them for fairness reasons.
By matching subjects’ survey responses with the decisions made in the experiment, I get the
following results. Regressions reported in Table B.1 show that in the main treatment those 14
percent of principals who do not perceive as unfair to offer a lower piece rate to the motivated
job candidate are more likely in the open contract - but not in the closed contract- to offer
a piece rate below the standard piece rate compared to the other principals (p < 0.1). This
difference is equally significant using a clustered version of the rank-sum test proposed by Datta
and Satten (2005). Furthermore, for this sub-sample of principals, Figures A.16 and A.17 show
that: (i) In the main treatment, throughout all time periods, the average piece rate offered in
the open contract is lower than the standard piece rate. (ii) In almost every period, the piece
rate differential between treatments is higher in the open contract than in the closed contract.19
Given the sub-sample small size, and given that the experiment was not designed to test this
preferred charity almost 3 times (11.7 points) as much as the agents allocate to a random charity in the list (4
points).
18Given a piece rate below the standard piece rate, only 8 percent of the observed effort levels are lower than
the piece rate offered in the open contract.
19However, potentially due to the lack of power in such a small sample, I cannot establish statistical signifi-
cance.
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specific hypothesis, this interpretation should be, however, taken with caution.
So the overall picture that emerges from this analysis is that principals are heterogeneous
in the extent to which they are willing to take advantage of agents’ intrinsic motivation by
saving on wages. Most principals seemed to be willing to take advantage of agents’ intrinsic
motivation as long as the offered piece rate was still higher or equal than the standard piece
rate. Contrary to the theoretical predictions, only one third of the principals were willing to
offer a motivated agent a piece rate below the standard piece rate in the open contract. These
results provide experimental support for previous survey evidence by Kahneman et al. (1986),
which suggests that fairness considerations can act as a constraint on the employers’ profits. In
this experiment, fairness considerations acted as a limited liability constraint. This constraint
made the substitution between monetary and non-monetary incentives imperfect.
3.5. Concluding Remarks
Recently, much attention has been devoted to study how agents respond to different monetary
and non-monetary incentives.20. There is no evidence, however, on how principals combine
these incentives in order to induce effort. This paper reports the results from an experiment
that was designed to test, for the first time, how principals write contracts when agents care
about the mission of their job and when the principals have two instruments, the piece rate
and the choice of the project mission, to influence the agents’ effort. Therefore, this study also
created a new paradigm that can be used for future laboratory experiments with motivated
agents and misaligned mission preferences between principals and agents.
On the whole, my results provide evidence for the validity of the theoretical predictions
from contract theory models with motivated agents (Besley and Ghatak, 2005; Delfgaauw and
Dur, 2007; Cassar, 2014b). I show that principals take advantage of agents’ intrinsic motivation
by lowering the piece rate and use the choice of the project mission as a substitute to motivate
effort. Because of fairness considerations, however, this substitution remains imperfect.
But, of course, some questions remain open. First, the experiment is designed to test
the validity of such predictions in a fully “neutral” environment, namely, in the absence of
additional features of labor relations that may play a role in a natural environment. In reality,
the matching of employers and workers is not exogenous, but rather, workers and employers
with similar mission preferences will try to match and form a long-term contractual relationship.
This selection and long-term interaction may, of course, enhance the development of social ties
between the employers and the workers and, in turn, increase the effect of fairness considerations
relative to a one-shot game. Whether these stronger fairness considerations would translate into
higher wages or into better alignments of the job mission with the workers’ preferred mission
remains, however, an open question.
Finally, while the experiment did not allow for any competitive forces, in a natural en-
vironment competition between workers plays a crucial role in the determination of wages.
More specifically, competition is likely to act against fairness considerations and reinforce the
substitutability between monetary and non-monetary incentives: why should a non-profit or-
20The latter include not only the job mission, but also status incentives and social recognition (Kosfeld and
Neckermann, 2011; Ashraf et al., 2014), corporate social responsibility (Koppel and Regner, 2013), and the job
impact (Kosfeld et al., 2014)
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ganization hire a new employee if it can count on the effort of a motivated volunteer who is
willing to work for free? These extensions are left for future work.
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Chapter 4
A Matter of Perspective: How Fairness
Views Depend on Relative Income
The redistribution of income has been and will presumably remain one of the most debated
aspects of public policy in modern economies. Furthermore, many other economic policy mea-
sures that do not aim at redistribution per se, but have redistributive consequences, are subject
to controversial discussions. It emerges clearly from these debates that preferences for redis-
tribution vary significantly between individuals. What explains this variation? As emphasized
by Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014, p. 787), our knowledge on this issue is still very limited:
“Despite the crucial role of preferences for redistribution in explaining institutional outcomes,
little empirical work has been done on how these preferences are formed and how and why they
change over time”.
A well-established finding in the empirical literature is the negative relationship between
preferences for redistribution and income (Fong, 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Alesina
and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln, 2007; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011; Luttmer and Singhal, 2011; Giuliano
and Spilimbergo, 2014; Owens and Pedulla, 2014; Powdthavee and Oswald, 2014).1 A simple
explanation for this pattern is self-interest: While high-income individuals want less redistri-
bution to avoid high taxes, low-income individuals want to benefit from transfers and thus
support more redistribution.
In this study, we argue that self-interest might not represent the full story. Empirical
evidence suggests that preferences for redistribution are not only driven by self-interest, but
also by individuals’ views on what is a fair distribution of income, henceforth fairness views
(Cappelen et al., 2007; Alma˚s et al., 2010; Cappelen et al., 2010, 2013). In our experiment, we
show that relative income has a causal effect on these fairness views. This suggests that income
affects individuals’ preferences for redistribution for reasons that go beyond the self-interest
channel – because it also changes their view on what is a fair income distribution.
The studies revealing a negative relationship between preferences for redistribution and
income cannot tell whether this is due to a causal effect of income on fairness views, and,
therefore, whether the observed negative relationship goes beyond reasons of self-interest. This
lack of evidence can be easily attributed to the endogeneity of income and/or to the difficulty
1All of these papers use survey data. Kataria and Montinari (2012) and Durante et al. (2014) provide
experimental evidence for a negative relationship between income and tax choices. Agranov and Palfrey (2014)
obtain an analogous result for the relationship between productivity and tax choices.
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of disentangling the effect of fairness views from selfish motives when eliciting preferences for
redistribution from field data.2 Experiments represent, therefore, a useful complementary tool
to address both of these issues.3
A series of experimental papers focuses on understanding the different types of fairness views
present in society (Frohlich et al., 2004; Cappelen et al., 2007; Alm˚as et al., 2010; Cappelen et al.,
2010, 2013; Mo¨llerstro¨m et al., 2014). These papers, however, treat fairness views as exogenous
and do not investigate how they are formed or why they may vary among individuals. The
determinants of these fairness views, and in particular the potential role of income, remain,
therefore, largely unknown.4,5
This study reports the results from a laboratory experiment that was designed to investigate
(1) if individuals’ relative income affects their fairness views and (2) whether this effect depends
on how the income is generated. The experiment consisted of an income generation phase and a
distribution phase. In the income generation phase, participants received a high or a low income
either through luck or through an effort-based tournament. In the distribution phase, we asked
a subset of subjects to make distributive decisions over the incomes of two other pairs of subjects
– one pair in which income differences were due to luck, and one in which income differences
were due to effort. Thus, in contrast to previous studies, the distributors in our experiment
were neither stakeholders, as they had no monetary stakes when making the decisions, nor
were they impartial spectators, as they had participated in the income generation phase. This
novel design enabled us to test how the distributors’ outcomes in the income generation phase
– not only the relative income but also whether the latter was generated by luck or by effort –
affected their fairness views. Furthermore, we elicited fairness views about the distribution of
2Even when income is exogenously generated, as in Owens and Pedulla (2014) and Powdthavee and Oswald
(2014), individuals who experience a positive income shock may report a lower preference for redistribution
because of selfish motives, i.e., to reduce the tax burden at their new position in the income distribution,
and/or because their fairness views become less egalitarian. In this latter case, but not necessarily in the
former, individuals would vote for low redistribution even when they have no private interests at stake. This
difference in motives, however, is hardly observable in field data.
3A related strand of literature focuses on the relationship between giving and income (Buckley and Croson,
2006; James and Sharpe, 2007; Piff et al., 2010; Erkal et al., 2011). While these papers obtain mixed results,
they cannot clarify the relationship between fairness views and income either. On the one hand, this is due
to the challenge of inferring fairness views from giving behavior, for which it is necessary to have variation in
the way how income differences between givers and receivers were generated, as well as to disentangle selfish
motives from fairness motives, e.g. through the estimation of a structural model as introduced by Cappelen
et al. (2007). The papers focusing on the relationship between income and giving satisfy neither of these two
requirements. Note, however, that the results of Erkal et al. (2011), who find in their experiment that high-
income individuals give less than low-income individuals, at least suggest that fairness views of the participants
differ across incomes. A further reason why the studies on the relationship between income and giving cannot
clarify a causal effect of income on fairness views is the endogeneity of income in these studies. However, in the
experiment of Buckley and Croson (2006) and in one treatment of Erkal et al. (2011), income is exogenous, but
has no effect on giving.
4Other studies try to investigate whether fairness principles may be chosen in an opportunistic way, i.e.,
to maximize one’s own monetary payoff (Rodriguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido, 2012; Ubeda, 2014; Tokumaru,
2014). In a related study, Becchetti et al. (2011) analyze how the choice of a distribution criterion depends on
the knowledge of one’s position in the income distribution. In our experiment, however, since participants had
no monetary stakes when making their redistributive decisions, such opportunistic behavior was ruled out by
design.
5Barr et al. (2012) relate the participants’ social status to their behavior in a dictator game. They find that
high-status individuals tend to acknowledge entitlement owing to effort more than low-status individuals. They
cannot, however, show that this is due to a causal effect of social status, as they cannot control for self-selection.
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income from luck and about the distribution of income from effort.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, we find that low-income individuals redis-
tribute significantly more than high-income individuals when the source of income differences
is the same as the one they experienced themselves. That is, when inequalities are due to luck
(effort), an individual who received a low income by lack of luck (effort) redistributes signifi-
cantly more than an individual who received a high income by luck (effort). The effect remains
unchanged when controlling for individual performance in the effort-based tournament, suggest-
ing that self-selection into different income levels does not drive the results. We thus conclude
that relative income, and how the latter is generated, has a causal effect on individuals’ fairness
views, and therefore, on preferences for redistribution beyond the self-interest channel.
Second, subjects’ responses in a post-experimental questionnaire suggest that the effect of
income on redistributive choices comes along with a consistent shift in beliefs about the degree
of individuals’ responsibility for a specific outcome. More specifically, individuals who received
a high income by effort (luck) attribute outcomes in the tournament (lottery) more to internal
factors (i.e., factors under their control) compared to individuals who received a low income by
lack of effort (luck). One interpretation of these findings is that the effect of relative income on
fairness views results from a change of beliefs about one’s responsibility over an outcome. This
belief follows a self-serving bias in responsibility attribution, that is, it takes credit for personal
successes and denies responsibility for failures (Miller and Ross, 1975; Bradley, 1978).
This study provides two main contributions to the literature. First of all, we enrich the
literature on the determinants of preferences for redistribution. We show that relative income
affects preferences for redistribution through its effect on views about what is a fair distribution
of income. Second, we contribute to the growing literature on fairness views. We show that
people’s fairness views are not fixed, but endogenous to the process of income generation, as
they depend on people’s relative income. Furthermore, our results on the self-serving bias in
responsibility attribution emphasize the importance of beliefs for fairness views.
The study also has important implications for our understanding of how societies think
about redistribution. Our results suggest that personal income changes individuals’ views
about a fair distribution of income in society. This implies that the conflict between rich and
poor in the debate about redistribution is not only a battle of personal interests, but also of
different ideologies. This difference in ideologies is such that it increases the discrepancy in
preferences for redistribution that is already caused by selfish motives. This means that there
will be disagreement between rich and poor about income redistribution even if people are
able to abstract from their own personal stake in this redistribution. Our results further imply
that the differences in ideologies between rich and poor are, at least to some degree, the result
of different individual outcomes in the process of income generation. As a consequence, an
increase in income inequality is likely to boost the polarization in political preferences, making
it harder for societies to reach a consensus about the optimal level of redistribution in the long
run.
In the following, we describe the design, experimental procedures and identification strate-
gies in greater detail (section 4.1), present the results (section 4.2), discuss potential channels
underlying the effects (section 4.3), and conclude (section 4.4).
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4.1. The Experiment
4.1.1. Design
The experiment consisted of two phases: An income generation phase and a distribution phase.
At the beginning of the experiment, we instructed the participants only about the income
generation phase, while telling them that the second phase would concern the distribution of
the incomes generated in the first phase. After the income generation phase had been completed,
we explained details of the distribution phase. We describe the two phases below.
Income generation phase
At the beginning of the income generation phase, the participants were randomly paired. Next,
they executed a real effort task. We used a variant of the slider task introduced by Gill and
Prowse (2012). This computerized task consists of a screen containing 48 sliders, which are
initially positioned at zero and can be moved as far as 100 using the mouse cursor.6 The goal
is to set as many sliders as possible to exactly fifty within 120 seconds. In our experiment,
we confronted the participants with a series of five of these screens, each for 120 seconds. The
total number of sliders adjusted to exactly fifty in the five screens represented the participants’
effort in the task. Before the sequence of five screens started, the participants had 60 seconds
to practice the task. After the time was up, the participants saw their effort on the computer
screen.
After all participants had completed the task and had seen their effort, every pair of partic-
ipants was randomly assigned to one of two treatments – a lottery treatment and a tournament
treatment. More specifically, half of the pairs within a session was assigned to the tournament
treatment, while the other half was assigned to the lottery treatment.
Each treatment implied a different income generation process in assigning a high and a
low income within a pair. In the tournament treatment, a high income was assigned to the
participant in the pair with higher effort in the task, and a low income to the other participant.
In the lottery treatment, the two incomes were randomly assigned within the pair. The income
levels were constant across both treatments. We paid 25 Swiss Francs (CHF) as high income and
CHF 5 as low income.7 At the end of the income generation phase, the participants observed
their own income, the income of the participant they were paired with, and the process that
had generated the incomes within their pair. They did, however, not observe the efforts of the
other participants in the tournament.
The income generation phase thus produced four types of participants (see Table 4.1): Those
with high income from the lottery (HiLot), those with low income from the lottery (LoLot),
those with high income from the tournament (HiTour), and those with low income from the
tournament (LoTour).
6We deactivated the mouse wheels and keyboards by software, so that the participants could only use the
mouse cursor to manipulate the sliders.
7At the time of the experiment, the exchange rate was CHF 1.22 per e and CHF 0.89 per US$.
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Table 4.1: Types in the income generation phase
Lottery Tournament
High income (CHF 25) HiLot HiTour
Low income (CHF 5) LoLot LoTour
Distribution phase
In the subsequent distribution phase, each pair was randomly assigned to one of two roles –
distributors, who kept their income from the first phase, and non-distributors, whose incomes
were subject to redistribution by the distributors. Per session, there were two pairs of non-
distributors – one from those pairs whose incomes had been generated through the lottery, and
one from those pairs whose incomes had been generated through the tournament.
In the next step, the distributors were asked to distribute the total income that was earned
within each non-distributor pair between both members of that pair. This means that every
distributor made two distributive decisions: One for the pair from the lottery treatment, and
one for the pair from the tournament treatment.8 The order of presentation was random, but it
was always made very clear for which pair the decision was currently made. Before confirming
the redistributive choices, the distributors had the possibility to go back and change the choices
for both pairs if they wanted to. The decisions were such that for each pair, the distributors
had to enter how much of the total income (CHF 30) should be distributed to the participant
who had earned CHF 25, and how much of it should be distributed to the one who had earned
CHF 5. The amounts given to both participants had to sum up to CHF 30 and were entered
in multiples of CHF 0.5. At the end of the distribution phase, the decisions of one distributor
were randomly chosen and applied to the non-distributor pairs. As final payoff, the distributors
received their income from the first phase, while the non-distributors received what had been
distributed to them by the randomly chosen distributor.
4.1.2. Procedural details
In total, 262 subjects participated in the experiment. We conducted 8 sessions with 32 to 34
participants each. The experiment lasted about an hour. It took place at the computer lab of
the University of Zurich, Switzerland, in March and April 2014. We recruited our participants
from local university students, excluding economics and psychology majors.9 To program and
conduct the experiment, we used the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007b). The instructions
used neutral language, avoiding terms like “tournament”, “winner”, or “distributor”. We kept
the participants’ identity and their decisions anonymous throughout the experiment. The
average payoff was CHF 25 (ca. US$ 28), including a participation fee of CHF 10 (ca. US$
11). We paid all payoffs individually and in private immediately after the experiment.
8While this may generate a demand effect on how to distribute income from different sources, this does not
generate a demand effect for the main question addressed in this study, namely, if there is any difference in
distributive decisions between individuals with different relative income.
9The recruitment was conducted with the software hroot (Bock et al., 2012b).
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4.1.3. Identification strategy
We use the distributors’ decisions in the distribution phase to infer their views on what is a
fair distribution of income – both for situations in which income differences are due to luck
(the lottery treatment) and for situations in which income differences are due to effort (the
tournament treatment).10
We believe that the distributive decisions identify the participants’ fairness views for the fol-
lowing reasons: First, since the distributors’ incomes were unaffected by their own distributive
decision, there was no self-interest involved in the redistribution. Second, as the instructions
made very clear that the distributors’ incomes were not subject to any decisions by the non-
distributors, the distributors had no reason to make accommodating distributive decisions in
order to induce reciprocal behavior on the side of the non-distributors. Third, there was no
reason for strategic decisions, since a distributor’s decision would either be discarded or fully
implemented. Fourth, distributive decisions were made only after the incomes had been gener-
ated. Furthermore, details about the distribution phase were unknown in the income generation
phase. Therefore, distributive decisions had no incentive effects in the first stage.11
The variation of the distributors’ income in the first phase allows us to identify the effect
of relative income on their fairness views. First, we compare the distributive decisions of those
with high income from the lottery (HiLot) and those with low income from the lottery (LoLot).
Since the selection of participants into both types was random, this gives us the causal effect
of relative income from luck. Second, to obtain the effect of relative income from effort, we
compare the decisions of those with high income from the tournament (HiTour) and those with
low income from the tournament (LoTour). In this comparison, however, we need to control
for self-selection. This is because more competitive or able individuals, who are more likely
to end up with high income from the tournament by exerting systematically higher effort,
may have different fairness views than others. As a consequence, differences in fairness views
between HiTour and LoTour could simply result from a higher share of competitive or more
able individuals among type HiTour. We control for self-selection by exploiting the random
variation in income between individuals with similar effort in the tournament. Indeed, among
individuals with similar effort, some were randomly matched with a participant with lower
effort than theirs and thus received a high income, while others were randomly matched with
a participant with higher effort than theirs and thus received a low income. The causal effect
of income from effort can be identified through the randomness of this matching.12 Further
details about our strategy to control for selection will be given below.
By keeping the distributors’ income levels constant and varying the process that generated
their income, we test whether there is an effect of the source of income on people’s fairness
views. This means that we separately compare the distributive decisions of those with high
10Clearly, the outcome of the tournament also depends on luck. Potential random factors are ability to handle
the mouse, physical and mental state at the day of the experiment, and, most importantly, the performance of
the opponent. This is, however, realistic in that there is no real-world income generation process which depends
solely on effort. We therefore believe that it is still reasonable to interpret income from the tournament as
income acquired through effort.
11We cannot rule out that subjects who are not motivated by any fairness consideration made their distributive
choices at random. However, this only adds noise to the data and thus, if anything, makes it harder to find any
effect.
12Note that if there were no randomness involved in the generation of income from effort, it would not be
possible to identify any causal effect.
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Table 4.2: Identification strategy
Comparison Effect
HiLot vs. LoLot income from luck
HiTour vs. LoTour income from effort
HiLot vs. HiTour income generation for high income
LoLot vs. LoTour income generation for low income
income (HiLot and HiTour) and of those with low income (LoLot and LoTour). While the
selection into both income generation processes was random, there has still been a self-selection
of individuals into both types from the tournament (HiTour and LoTour). Therefore, we also
control for selection in the latter two comparisons. A design feature that facilitates this is the
fact that all participants, before being allocated to the treatments, were required to complete
the effort task. While this feature probably increased the discrepancy between the experimental
and the natural environment, it did not only allow us to control for selection, but also avoided
that individuals who were in the tournament treatment had an informational advantage about
the experience of solving the task. The latter could have led to different redistributive choices
compared to individuals in the lottery treatment.13 Table 4.2 summarizes our identification
strategy.
4.2. Results
First of all, we confirm the well-established result that inequalities which are due to effort tend
to be accepted more than inequalities which are due to luck (Cappelen et al., 2007; Alm˚as et al.,
2010; Cappelen et al., 2010; Krawczyk, 2010; Rustichini and Vostroknutov, 2014; Kataria and
Montinari, 2012; Vostroknutov et al., 2012; Cappelen et al., 2013; Durante et al., 2014).14 As
Figure 4.1 shows, the average amount distributed to the individual with low income from the
tournament (LoTour) is approximately 40 percent lower (signed-rank p=0.00) than the average
amount distributed to the participant with low income from the lottery (LoLot). Thus, we can
be confident that the distributive situations induced in our experiment are comparable to those
in earlier studies, and that even though the distributors did not have any material interest at
stake, their fairness motives were strong enough to incentivize their redistributive choices.
13It is important to mention, however, that we cannot fully rule out informational asymmetries between
participants in different treatments. More specifically, in the tournament treatment participants could infer
from their income whether the effort of the participant they were matched with was higher or lower than theirs.
Therefore, compared to individuals in the lottery treatment, individuals in the tournament treatment had an
informational advantage through their performance in the task relative to others. It is not clear, however, how
this might affect the comparison we are interested in. On the other hand, the alternative – also informing the
participants in the lottery treatment about how their performance in the task compared to the performance of
the participant they were matched with – bears the risk of mitigating the treatment effect: Lottery winners may
not feel as a winners anymore if they knew with certainty that they would have won the tournament anyway.
14Consistent with these experimental findings are the results of Fong (2001), Bullock et al. (2003), Alesina and
La Ferrara (2005), Alesina and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln (2007), Isaksson and Lindskog (2009) and Alesina and Giuliano
(2011). Using survey data, they show that preferences for redistribution are increasing in the individuals’ belief
to which degree economic outcomes are the result of luck rather than of effort. They show that preferences for
redistribution are decreasing in the individual’s level of subjective freedom.
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Figure 4.1: Decisions for both distributive situations. Heights of bars and values at bottom of
bars correspond to means of amount (in CHF) distributed to the participant with low income.
Lengths of whiskers at top of bars are equal to standard errors of the means.
We now focus on the differences in distributive decisions between types. Out of our 230
distributors, we observe 59 of type HiLot and 59 of type LoLot, as well as 56 of type HiTour
and 56 of type LoTour. Figure 4.2 shows the distributive decision of all four types for the pair
from the lottery (left panel) and for the pair from the tournament (right panel).
4.2.1. Relative income from luck
We first analyze the effect of relative income from luck. On average, HiLot distributes about
CHF 2.5 or 13 percent less to the non-distributor of type LoLot than LoLot does (rank-sum
p=0.01). Surprisingly, LoLot distributes even significantly more than half of the total income
that was earned in the pair to LoLot, which essentially reverses the inequality in this pair
(CHF 18.5, signed-rank p=0.00).15 This result, which could be interpreted as in-group bias
or spite towards lottery winners on the side of the lottery losers, is consistent with previous
evidence.16 On the contrary, we find no difference in how much HiLot and LoLot distribute to
the non-distributor of type LoTour (rank-sum p=0.63).17 We conclude:
Result 6 We find a causal effect of relative income from luck on fairness views. The effect is
such that individuals with low income from (lack of) luck redistribute significantly more than
individuals with high income from luck when inequalities are due to luck.
15The amount distributed to LoLot by HiLot is not significantly higher than half of the total income (signed-
rank p=0.16).
16Rustichini and Vostroknutov (2014) find in a different experimental setting that individuals are willing to
reduce the lottery winnings of others at a cost to themselves.
17See Figure C.1 for histograms of the distributive decisions of HiLot and LoLot for the pair from the lottery.
56
16.0
HiLot
18.5
LoLot
15.7
HiTour
16.4
LoTour
Distributive decisions
 for pair from lottery
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
CH
F 
to
 L
oL
ot
8.9
HiLot
9.9
LoLot
8.4
HiTour
13.8
LoTour
Distributive decisions
 for pair from tournament
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
CH
F 
to
 L
oT
o
u
r
Figure 4.2: Distributive decisions of the four types. Heights of bars and values at bottom of
bars correspond to means of amount (in CHF) distributed to the participant with low income.
Lengths of whiskers at top of bars are equal to standard errors of the means.
4.2.2. Relative income from effort
Next, we consider the effect of relative income from effort by comparing the distributive de-
cisions of HiTour and LoTour. There is no difference in how much both distribute to the
non-distributor of type LoLot (rank-sum p=0.43). However, HiTour distributes about CHF
5 or 40% less to the non-distributor of type LoTour than LoTour does.18 This difference is
significant (rank-sum p=0.00), but, as argued above, may be due to selection effects.
In order to control for potential selection, we regress the amount in CHF distributed to
the participant with low income from the tournament on a dummy variable for HiTour, and
various controls for the distributors’ effort in the income generation phase. We use linear and
quadratic specifications, as well as fixed effects for effort bins of different sizes. An effort bin of
size x means that we split the range of observed effort levels (0 to 169) into intervals of size x,
and allow for a common fixed effect among all distributors whose effort levels are in the same
interval. This keeps the distributors’ effort level constant, so that the dummy variable captures
only the variation that is caused by switching from low income to high income. This variation
is purely exogenous: If the distributors’ effort is fixed, whether they received high income in the
tournament depends on the random event of whether they had been matched with a partner
who had a lower effort than themselves. As a result, the coefficient of the dummy variable is
an unbiased estimate of the effect of income from effort, while the coefficients for the various
controls measure the selection effect. Note that an alternative interpretation of the coefficient
of the dummy variable is that it measures the effect of luck that made effort pay off.
Table 4.3 shows the regression results. They suggest that the difference in distributive de-
18See Figure C.2 for histograms of the distributive decisions of HiTour and LoTour for the pair from the
tournament.
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Table 4.3: Effect of income from effort on CHF distributed to LoTour
Control for effort None Linear Quadratic FE(10) FE(5) FE(2.5)
Constant 13.78*** 16.16*** 18.33*** 15.00** 15.00** 15.00**
(0.93) (2.60) (4.27) (7.03) (7.09) (7.28)
HiTour -5.34*** -4.50*** -4.72*** -3.92** -3.69* -4.05*
(1.31) (1.57) (1.61) (1.76) (1.91) (2.13)
F-test contr. (p) 0.330 0.506 0.677 0.725 0.844
N 112 112 112 112 112 112
R2 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.22 0.29 0.38
Adj. R2 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.03
Ordinary least squares regressions. Dependent variable: CHF distributed to LoTour. Sample: HiTour and
LoTour. FE(x) means fixed effects for effort bins of size x. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Standard errors
in parentheses.
cisions between HiTour and LoTour is not caused by selection, but by realized income itself.
In fact, the estimate of the coefficient of the dummy variable is always negative and at least
marginally significant. Furthermore, we can never reject the joint hypothesis that the coeffi-
cients of the controls are all zero (see row “F-test contr. (p)” in Table 4.3), suggesting that
effort, and thus selection, has no predictive power. We believe that a bin size of 2.5 is sufficient
to control for selection. Otherwise, one would have to argue that distributors whose effort levels
differ by 2.5 or less units both exhibit a systematically different probability of receiving high
income and differ significantly in their fairness views – a case that is unlikely.19,20 Hence, we
obtain:
Result 7 We find a causal effect of relative income from effort on fairness views. The effect
is such that individuals with high income from effort are less averse to inequalities that are due
to effort than individuals with low income from (lack of) effort. The effect is entirely driven by
the luck that made the effort of high-income individuals pay off.21
4.2.3. Income generation
We now investigate whether, keeping the amount of income constant, the source of this income
has an effect on fairness views. When comparing the decisions of distributors with high income
(HiLot and HiTour), we find no difference in how much both distribute to LoLot and to Lo-
Tour (ranks-sum p=0.58 and p=0.45), suggesting that there are no differences in distributive
decisions between income generation processes for high income. However, when we compare
the decisions of distributors with low income (LoLot and LoTour), the picture is different. On
the one hand, LoLot distributes more to non-distributors of type LoLot than LoTour does.
19With a bin size of 5 or 2.5, the coefficient of the dummy variable is only marginally significant. Note that
there is a tradeoff when decreasing the bin size further: While the control of the selection effect improves, the
variation in the dummy variable decreases, because there are fewer distributors with different income levels per
bin. Hence, an explanation for the lower significance with a bin size smaller than 10 is the limited sample size.
20Note that the amount distributed to HiLot is restricted to the interval [0, 30]. When using a Tobit model
rather than ordinary least squares to take this censoring into account, the estimate of the coefficient of the
dummy variable is always significant.
21This contrasts with Erkal et al. (2011), who attribute their finding of a negative relationship between giving
and income primarily to self-selection.
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This difference is close to being marginally significant (rank-sum p=0.10).22 On the other
hand, LoTour distributes significantly more to non-distributors of type LoTour than LoLot
does (rank-sum p=0.01). To control for selection, we proceed analogously as for the effect of
income from effort and regress the amounts distributed to each participant on a dummy for
LoTour, as well as on various controls for effort. Table C.1 and Table C.2 show the results.
The estimates for the coefficients of the dummy variable are at least marginally significant with
linear and quadratic controls for effort.23 We conclude:
Result 8 There is a causal effect of the income generation process on the fairness views of
low-income individuals, as the latter become more averse against the sources of inequalities that
made themselves poor. There is no evidence for an effect of the income generation process on
the fairness views of high-income individuals.
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Figure 4.3: Beliefs about income generation processes. Heights of bars and values at bottom of
bars correspond to means of belief about luck dependence of the process. Lengths of whiskers
at top of bars are equal to standard errors of the means.
Different explanations, not necessarily mutually exclusive, can account for the observed
variation in the redistributive decisions, and thus in the fairness views, of the four types of
distributors. One explanation for the results is a self-serving bias in attribution of responsibil-
ity. Earlier research has demonstrated that people take credit for personal successes and deny
responsibility for failures (Miller and Ross, 1975; Bradley, 1978). More specifically, successful
22When using a t-test, we obtain marginal significance of the difference (p=0.05).
23When using the Tobit model, we also obtain a marginally significant estimate when using fixed effects for
effort bins of size 10.
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individuals tend to attribute their outcome to circumstances under their control (so-called inter-
nal factors), whereas unsuccessful individuals tend to attribute their outcome to circumstances
not under their control (so-called external factors). For our experiment, this would predict
that high-income individuals from the tournament (HiTour) tend to attribute the outcome of
the tournament more to internal factors than low-income individuals from the tournament (Lo-
Tour). Analogous predictions would hold for high-income and low-income individuals from the
lottery (HiLot and LoLot).24 Given the well-established result that individuals favor a more
equal distribution of income when the latter is due to luck – an external factor – rather than
effort or choice – which are internal factors – (see discussion in section 4.2), this would explain
our observations for redistributive behavior: If distributors of type HiTour attribute the out-
come of the tournament less to external factors than LoTour, they would redistribute less than
LoTour in the pair of non-distributors whose incomes were generated in the tournament. A
similar argument would hold for the distributors of type HiLot and LoLot.
We test this hypothesis of self-serving bias by analyzing the participants’ responses to a
survey conducted at the end of the experiment. Participants were asked to state, on a scale
from 1 to 10, to what extent they thought that the outcome in the tournament treatment was
due to effort rather than to luck, where “1” represented “all due to effort” and “10” represented
“all due to luck”. Similarly, the participants were asked to choose from 1 to 10, to what extent
they thought that the outcome in the lottery treatment was due to “individual attributes
(e.g. karma, religiousness)” rather than to luck, where “1” represented “all due to individuals
attributes” and “10” represented “all due to luck”.25
Figure 4.3 shows the average beliefs of all four types of distributors regarding the lottery
(left panel) and the tournament (right panel).
Consistent with the self-serving bias hypothesis, we find that HiTour distributors believe
significantly less (rank-sum p=0.00) in the luck dependence of the tournament than LoTour
distributors do. This result does not change when controlling for self-selection (see Table C.3).26
Similarly, although to a smaller extent, HiLot distributors believe significantly less (rank-sum
p=0.00) in the luck dependence of the lottery than LoLot distributors do.27 While the latter
might seem surprising, as individuals cannot be responsible for the outcome of a lottery, this is
consistent with previous evidence by Gurdal et al. (2013), which shows that principals blame
agents for the outcome of a lottery regardless of the agents’ choices. We obtain:28
Result 9 High-income individuals believe less in the luck dependence of their outcomes com-
pared to low-income individuals.
Thus, result 9 identifies a self-serving bias on responsibility attribution as a potential channel
24It might seem absurd at first why anyone would believe that internal factors play a role in the lottery –
whose outcome is random. However, certain philosophies such as Buddism view an individual’s fortune as the
result of past actions. Hence, it is at least possible that some high-income individuals from the lottery attribute
their success to such internal factors. This perspective would deny pure randomness of the lottery.
25We always asked the question about the outcome of the tournament treatment first.
26HiTour and LoTour also differ in their belief regarding the lottery (rank-sum p=0.02).
27For histograms of the beliefs, see Figure C.3 and Figure C.4.
28Similar results follow when comparing beliefs between individuals with the same income, but different income
generation process. LoTour believes significantly more in the luck dependence of the tournament than LoLot
(rank-sum p=0.00), and vice-versa (rank-sum p=0.01). HiLot attributes outcomes from the lottery significantly
more to internal factors than HiTour (rank-sum p=0.00). The reverse, however, is not true (rank-sum p=0.56).
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of the effect of relative income and of its generation process on individuals’ fairness views.
Note that another explanation for the variation in the redistributive decisions is a direct in-
group bias: Be nicer to those who are similar to yourself. If individuals with the same relative
income and the same process of income generation develop a group-identity feeling, this may
explain why, on average, non-distributors receive more from a distributor of their own type than
from a distributor of a competing type.29 This applies in particular to low-income individuals
from lack of luck, who redistribute significantly more than half to low-income individuals from
the lottery. Previous evidence on redistributive choices has indeed shown the effect of in-group
favoritism based on race (Luttmer, 2001), on age and gender (Cardenas and Sethi, 2010), on
risk-taking choices (Costard and Bolle, 2011), and on field of studies (Klor and Shayo, 2010).
In our experiment, distributors had only information about the individuals’ relative income and
the process that generated that income. Therefore, these were the only characteristics that may
have generated a group-identity feeling. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out that a pure in-group
bias is also playing a role in the redistributive decisions (especially for low-income individuals
from the lottery) besides the self-serving bias on responsibility attribution, as both channels
cannot be distinguished in our data.30
Finally, we would like to point out a further implication of result 9: It suggests that the
individuals’ experience in terms of their economic outcomes affects their beliefs about how these
outcomes have come about. This aligns well with previous papers that emphasize an effect
of past experience, such as communism (Alesina and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln, 2007) and recessions
(Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014), on beliefs.31 We add to this literature by showing that
idiosyncratic events, not only phenomena affecting the society as a whole, play a role in the
formation of beliefs about inequality, too. Furthermore, our findings suggest a substantial
degree of subjectivity in these beliefs: Even when the luck dependence of an income generation
process in known and fixed (as in the lottery), there are individuals whose beliefs deviate from
this objective truth (HiLot).
4.4. Conclusion
In this experiment, we vary the participants’ income and the way their income is generated.
We then elicit their fairness views through their redistributive decisions over other participants’
incomes. We find a causal effect of relative income on fairness views. This effect is such that in
comparison to high-income individuals, low-income individuals redistribute significantly more
when the source of inequalities is the same as the one that made themselves poor. We then
argue that an explanation for this result is a self-serving bias on responsibility attribution,
which is supported by our data: Compared to low-income individuals, high-income individuals
29On average, HiLot receives CHF 14.0 from HiLot, but only CHF 11.5 from LoLot. Similarly, LoLot receives
CHF 18.5 from LoLot, but only CHF 16 from HiLot. Analogous comparisons hold for HiTour and LoTour:
HiTour receives CHF 21.6 from HiTour, but only CHF 16.2 from LoTour. LoTour receives 13.8 from LoTour,
but only 8.4 from LoLot.
30When regressing the amount distributed to LoTour on a dummy variable for HiTour and beliefs for the
tournament, both variables have explanatory power for the distributive decisions. This suggests that income
affects distributive choices not only through a change of beliefs. Therefore, self-serving biases in the belies may
not the be the only relevant channel.
31Theoretical papers focusing on belief formation and how it affects redistributive policies are Piketty (1995),
Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Benabou and Tirole (2006).
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tend to believe more that their outcome is the result of internal rather than external factors.
Our results suggest that personal income changes individuals’ views about a fair distribu-
tion of income in society. More specifically, we show that personal income may increase the
acceptance of income differences. This would create conflicting ideologies between rich and poor
and increase the discrepancy in preferences for redistribution beyond what is already caused
by selfish motives. As a consequence, rising income inequality, by increasing the polarization
in political preferences, is likely to make it even harder for societies to reach a consensus about
redistribution in the long run.
One should, however, always be cautious when generalizing from the results of a particular
study. Note that what we identify is essentially an effect of relative income made in an exper-
iment on individuals’ views about what is a fair distribution of income from that experiment.
Of course, the fair distribution of income in society is a much more fundamental question than
that of a fair distribution of experimental income. Furthermore, the experiment was designed
to test the validity of some hypotheses in isolation, namely, in the absence of additional features
that may play a role in a natural environment. For instance, in the field, individuals do not
actually make direct redistributive decisions over other people’s incomes, but use their voting
right to influence redistribution. Furthermore, their voting decisions often affect their personal
income in addition to the income of others. While new treatments can always be run to study
the role of each of these environmental features, it is precisely the absence of these features in
our experiment that allowed us to rule out selfish motives and strategic behavior and, thus, to
identify the causal effect of relative income on individuals’ fairness views. These fairness views
have been shown to be a significant determinant of preferences for redistribution in the labora-
tory and in the field. Therefore, we believe that our study, by increasing our understanding of
how these fairness views may be formed, leaves a message that is relevant for future theoretical
and empirical studies on distributive justice: Fairness views about income distribution should
not be treated as exogenous, as they are likely to depend on individuals’ relative income.
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Appendix A
Appendix: Chapter 2
Proof of Proposition 1
First, notice that by replacing the optimal ex-post level of effort in (9), the incentive compati-
bility constraint in (7) can be rewritten as
Ui(θi) = maxθˆi∈ΘEθ−i
(
pi(θˆi, θ−i) + qi(θˆi, θ−i)12θ
2
iG(mA −mi(θˆi, θ−i))2
)
By the Envelope Theorem, this implies:
U ′i(θi) = Eθ−i
(
qi(θ)θiG(mA −mi(θ))2
)
Ui(θi) = Ui(0) +
∫ θi
0
Eθ−i
(
qi(ti, θ−i)tiG(mA −mi(ti, θ−i))2
)
dti
The expected payment to agent i is then
pi(θi) = Eθ−ipi(θ) = pi(0)+
∫ θi
0
Eθ−i
(
q(ti, θ−i)tiG(mA−m(ti, θ−i))2
)
dti−Eθ−i
(
qi(θ)
1
2
θ2iG(mA−mi(θ))2
)
The participation constraint binds for the lowest type, thus pi(0) = 0. This proves equation
(13).
Let now turn our attention to the principal’s expected utility. After replacing the optimal
effort level in (9), equation (6) becomes
E(VD) = Eθ
( n∑
i=1
qi(θ)θDθiG(mi(θ)−mD)G(mA −mi(θ))− pi(θ)
)
(A-1)
This can be rewritten as
E(VD) =
n∑
i=1
∫ 1
0
(
Eθ−i
(
qi(θ)θDθiG(mi(θ)−mD)G(mA −mi(θ))
)
− pi(θi)
)
f(θi)dθi (A-2)
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Substituting the expected payment with equation (13) and interchanging the order of integra-
tion in the last term then gives
E(VD) =
n∑
i=1
∫ 1
0
Eθ−i
(
qi(θ)θDθiG(mi(θ)−mD)G(mA −mi(θ)) + qi(θ)θ
2
i
2
G(mA −mi(θ))2
− 1− F (θi)
f(θi)
qi(θ)θiG(mA −mi(θ))2
)
f(θi)dθi
which can also be rewritten as
E(VD) =
n∑
i=1
Eθ
(
qi(θ)
(
θDθiG(mi(θ)−mD)G(mA −mi(θ)) + θ
2
i
2
G(mA −mi(θ))2
− 1− F (θi)
f(θi)
θiG(mA −mi(θ))2
))
f(θ)dθ
where f(θ) is the joint density of θ = (θ1, ..., θn). Since the intrinsic motivation levels are
independently distributed, f(θ) = f(θ1)× f(θ2)× ...× f(θn) . By maximizing with respect to
mi(θ), I find the optimal mission as a function of the agents’ i intrinsic motivation level as in
defined in equation (12):
θi − 21−F (θi)f(θi)
θD
=
G′(m∗i −mD)
G′(mA −m∗i )
− G(m
∗
i −mD)
G(mA −m∗i )
The assumption that G′(0) = 0 is sufficient for the second order conditions to be satisfied. This
proves equation (12).1 As far as the comparative statics are concerned, if θi increases, by the
regularity condition of F (.), the LHS in equation (12) increases, so the RHS in equation (12)
must also increase, which means that either G′(mi −mD)/G′(mA −mi) increases or G(mi −
mD)/G(mA−mi) decreases, or both. Since G(x) is decreasing in x, G(mi−mD)/G(mA−mi)
gets smaller as mA −mi decreases and mi −mD increases. Similarly, since G(x) is decreasing
and concave, G′(mi−mD)/G′(mA−mi) increases as G′(mi−mD) decreases (i.e. becomes more
negative) and G′(mA−mi) increases (i.e. becomes less negative), that is, as mA−mi decreases
and mi −mD increases. This implies that m∗i (θi) is increasing.
Let me define by X(θi) the equivalent of the virtual valuations in Myerson (1981):
X(θi) = θDθiG(m
∗
i (θi)−mD)G(mA −m∗i (θi)) + θi
[θi
2
− 1− F (θi)
f(θi)
]
G(mA −m∗i (θi))2 (A-3)
By replacing (12) in (A-3), it becomes clear that the virtual valuations are positive for all θi.
This means that under the optimal mechanism - with c = 0 - no type is excluded from the
competition. To derive the optimal allocation rule, I look at the derivative of X(θi):
dX
dθi
=
dX
dm∗i
dm∗i
dθi
+
∂X
∂θi
1To rule out potential corner solutions, I assume that θD is large enough such that θi > 2
1−F (θi)
f(θi)
−
θDG(0)/G(mA −mD), ∀ θi.
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The product term is equal to zero by the FOC. Thus, we have
X ′(θi) = θDG(m∗i (θi)−mD)G(mA−m∗i (θi)) +G(mA−m∗i (θi))2
[
θi
(
1−
∂ 1−F (θi)
f(θi)
∂θi
)
− 1− F (θi)
f(θi)
]
Rearranging the term above gives the following condition for the positive monotonicity of the
virtual valuations:
θi > s(θi)
−1
(1− F (θi)
f(θi)
− θDG(m
∗
i (θi)−mD)
G(mA −m∗i (θi))
)
(A-4)
where s(θi) = 1 − ∂[(1 − F (θi))/f(θi)]/∂θi. From the monotone hazard rate property of F (.),
we know that ∂[(1 − F (θi))/f(θi)]/∂θi < 0, which implies that 0 < s(θi)−1 < 1. When
(1−F (θi))/f(θi) < θDG(m∗i (θi)−mD)/G(mA−m∗i (θi)) it is immediately clear that the condition
in (A-4) is always satisfied. By replacing the LHS of (A-4) with the FOC in (12), one can
show that the monotonicity of the virtual valuations also holds when (1 − F (θi))/f(θi) >
θDG(m
∗
i (θi)−mD)/G(mA −m∗i (θi)):
2
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
− θDG(m
∗
i −mD)
G(mA −m∗i )
+
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
θD
G′(m∗i −mD)
G′(mA −m∗i )
> s(θi)
−1
(1− F (θi)
f(θi)
− θDG(m
∗
i −mD)
G(mA −m∗i )
)
Rearranging:
(
2− s(θi)−1
)1− F (θi)
f(θi)
−
(
1− s(θi)−1
)θDG(m∗i −mD)
G(mA −m∗i )
+ θD
G′(m∗i −mD)
G′(mA −m∗i )
> 0
Since 0 < s(θi)
−1 < 1 and (1 − F (θi))/f(θi) > θDG(m∗i (θi) − mD)/G(mA − m∗i (θi)), the
expression above is always positive. This implies that the optima allocation rule is
q∗i (θ) =
{
1 if θi > max∀j 6=i θj
0 otherwise
(A-5)
This completes the proof of Proposition 1.2
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the following scoring rule:
S∗(m, p) = θDm−10 (m)G(m−mD)G(mA −m)− p− θD
∫ m
v
∂m−10 (s)
∂m
G(s−mD)G(mA − s)ds
+
∫ m
v
1− F (m−10 (s))
f(m−10 (s))
m−10 (s)2G(mA − s)G′(mA − s)ds
2The monotonocity of q∗i and m
∗
i guarantee that the single crossing differences condition, ∂U
∗
i /∂θˆi∂θi > 0,
holds and, therefore, that the incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied.
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for m ∈ [m0(0),m0(1)] and where m0(.) is the optimal mission in equation (12) and v is any real
number. From Lemma 1 in Che (1993), I know that under the first- and second-score auction
with general scoring rule S(m, p), each agent bids an m that maximizes S(m, p)+
θ2i
2
G(mA−m)2.
Thus, with scoring rule S∗(m, p) defined above, each agent chooses the mission that maximizes
Z(θi,m) = θDm
−1
0 (m)G(m−mD)G(mA −m)− p− θD
∫ m
v
∂m−10 (s)
∂m
G(s−mD)G(mA − s)ds
+
∫ m
v
1− F (m−10 (s))
f(m−10 (s))
m−10 (s)2G(mA − s)G′(mA − s)ds+
θ2i
2
G(mA −m)2
By the product rule, the expression above can be rewritten as
Z(θi,m) =
∫ m
v
θDm
−1
0 (s)[G
′(s−mD)G(mA − s)−G(s−mD)G′(mA − s)]
+
1− F (m−10 (s))
f(m−10 (s))
m−10 (s)2G(mA − s)G′(mA − s)ds− p+
θ2i
2
G(mA −m)2
Taking the derivative wrt m
∂Z(θi,m)
∂m
= θDm
−1
0 (m)[G
′(m−mD)G(mA − s)−G(m−mD)G′(mA −m)]
+
1− F (m−10 (m))
f(m−10 (m))
m−10 (m)2G(mA −m)G′(mA −m)− θ2iG(mA −m)G′(mA −m)
= 0 if m = m0(θi)
where m0(θi) is the mission rule that satisfies the FOCs in (12). Thus, I have shown that the
optimal mission is implemented by the modified scoring rule S∗(m, p). Since under the first
and second-score auction with scoring rule S∗(m, p), both the allocation rule and the project
mission are the same as under the optimal mechanism, the first-and second-score auctions
with this optimal scoring rule give the same expected utility to the principal than the optimal
mechanism.
Proof of Proposition 3
I now show that the optimal mechanism when the project mission must be fixed ex-ante can be
implemented through a second-price auction (with or without ceiling price). In a second price
auction the principal’s expected utility from a bidder with intrinsic motivation θi ≥ θ is
E(VD) = θDθiG(m−mD)G(mA −m)F (θi)n−1 + G(mA −m)
2
2
θ2F (θ)n−1
+
∫ θi
θ
G(mA −m)2
2
x2(n− 1)F (x)n−2f(x)dx
So the principal’s overall expected utility is
E(VD) = θDG(m−mD)G(mA −m)(1− F1(θ))E(Y1/Y1 > θ) + G(mA −m)
2
2
θ2nF (θ)n−1(1− F (θ))
+ 1
2
G(mA −m)2(1− F2(θ))E(Y 22 /Y2 > θ)
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Taking the derivative of E(VD) with respect to θ and rearranging gives
2
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
− 2θDG(m−mD)
G(mA −m) − θ ≤ 0 (A-6)
If the expression above is negative ∀ θ, then the second price auction should not have a ceiling
price and the optimal mission satisfies the FOC in equation (20). If the expression above can
hold with equality, the second price auction should have a ceiling price p(θ) and optimal mission
m, where m and θ solve the following system of equations
2
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
− 2θDG(m−mD)
G(mA −m) − θ = 0 (A-7)
(1− F2(θ))E(Y 22 |Y2 > θ) + θ2F (θ)n−1(1− F (θ))n
(1− F1(θ))E(Y1|Y1 > θ)θD −
G′(m−mD)
G′(mA −m) +
G(m−mD)
G(mA −m) = 0 (A-8)
where F1(.) and F2(.) are, respectively, the distribution function of the first and second highest
order statistic of n independently drawn θ. So under the second price auction with ceiling price
p(θ), the optimal allocation rule is
qSPi (θ) =
{
1 if θi > max∀j 6=i θj and θi > θ
SP
0 otherwise
Following the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 1, the principal’s utility under the
optimal mechanism can be rewritten as
E(VD) =
n∑
i=1
Eθ
(
qi(θ)
(
θDθiG(m−mD)G(mA −m) + θ
2
i
2
G(mA −m)2
− 1− F (θi)
f(θi)
θiG(mA −m)2
))
f(θ)dθ
The virtual valuations in the expression above are positive for those agents whose θi satisfies
2
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
− 2θDG(m
∗ −mD)
G(mA −m∗) − θi ≤ 0
Notice that the expression above coincides with inequality (A-6). Furthermore, for those θi
that satisfies this equation, it can be check that the virtual valuations are increasing in θi. This
means that the allocation rule under the optimal mechanism is the same as under the second
price auction: q∗i (θ) = q
SP
i (θ). This in turn implies that the expected utility of the principal
under the second price auction is the same as under the optimal mechanism, and therefore so
is the optimally chosen mission.
Finally, notice that by the Revenue Equivalence Theorem, the optimal mechanism can also
be implemented through any (reverse) auction in the wide class of auctions that allocate the
price to the lowest bidder, namely, first-price auction, all-pay auction, and so on. Indeed, since
such auctions have the same allocation rule and yield the same expected payment to the seller,
the optimal project mission chosen ex-ante will also be the same.
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Proof of Proposition 4
a) For any distribution function F (.) over the interval [0, 1], it holds that
lim
n→∞
E[Y 22 ]
E[Y1]
≥ lim
n→∞
E[Y2] = 1
This gives us a lower bound for when competition is high. Furthermore, since:
E[Y 22 ] ≤ E[Y2.1] = E[Y2] ≤ E[Y1]
it follows that E[Y 22 ]/E[Y1] ≤ 1 for any finite n.
b) Consider any distribution function F (.) over the interval [0, 1]. Then, a sufficient but not
necessary condition for dm∗/dn > 0 is dE[Y1]/dn − dE[Y 22 ]/dn < 0. After few mathematical
steps you get
S = E[Y1]− E[Y 22 ] =
∫ 1
0
nF (x)n−12x− F (x)n(1 + 2x(n− 1))dx
Taking the derivative with respect to n gives and rearranging gives
dS
dn
=
∫ 1
0
F (x)n−1{2x(1− F (x))(1 + log[F (x)]n) + log[F (x)]F (x)(2x− 1)}dx
The overall sign of the expression above depends on the sign of the expression in the curly
brackets. The last term is independent of n while the first term gets more negative as n in-
creases. So there must exists a value of n, which I define n0, such that for any n ≥ n0 the
expression above is negative. Therefore, dm∗/dn > 0 for any n ≥ n0 .
c) I now show that for the uniform and any power function distributions, E[Y 22 ]/E[Y1] is
strictly increasing in n. If F (.) is uniformly distributed, E[Y 22 ] = (n− 1)n/(n+ 1)(n+ 2), and
E[Y1] = n/(n+ 1). This gives E[Y
2
2 ]/E[Y1] = (n− 1)/(n+ 2) which is strictly increasing in n.
Let’s take any power function distribution F (θ) = θa:
E[Y 22 ]
E[Y1]
=
a(n− 1)(1 + an)
(2 + a(n− 1))(2 + an)
Taking the first derivative with respect to n and simplifying gives:
dS
dn
=
2(a− 1)
(2 + a(n− 1))2 +
2 + a
(2 + an)2
The expression above is clearly positive for a ≥ 1. For a < 1
2 + a
(2 + an)2
>
2(1− a)
(2 + a(n− 1))2
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After few algebraic steps we get
a3((n− 1)2 + n2) + 2a2(2n− 1) > 0
which always holds for any n ≥ 2.
Proof of Proposition 5
Let’s define the expected value of the LHS of equation (12) as
R =
∫ 1
0
(
θi − 21− F (θi)
f(θi)
)
f1(θi)dθi
where f1(.) is the density function of the first order statistic of n independently drawn θ. To
prove that the expected agent’s ideological compromise is lower under the optimal mechanism
with ex-ante fixed mission than under the optimal scoring auction, I need to show that R(θ) <
E[Y 22 ]/E[Y1]. Let’s start by rewriting
R = E[Y1]− 2n(E[Y1]− E[Y (n−1)1 ])
where E[Y
(n−1)
1 ] is the expected value of the first order statistics of (n− 1) independent drawn
values of θ. Notice that
2nE[Y
(n−1)
1 ] = 2(E[Y2] + (n− 1)E[Y1])
which, after few algebraic steps, gives
R = 2E[Y2]− E[Y1]
Thus, it is sufficient to show that
2E[Y2]− E[Y1] < E[Y
2
2 ]
E[Y1]
which then leads to
−(E[Y1]− E[Y2])2 < E[Y 22 ]− E[Y2]2
The equation above always holds as the LHS is negative and the RHS is positive. Since
(1− F2(θ))E(Y 22 |Y2 > θ) + θ2F (θ)n−1(1− F (θ))n
(1− F1(θ))E(Y1|Y1 > θ) ≥
E[Y 22 ]
E[Y1]
I have shown that under the optimal price-only competition (with or without exclusion), the
agent’s expected ideological compromise is lower than under the optimal scoring auction.
69
Proof of Proposition 6
I restrict my attention to contracts in which m(θ) is continuous. This implies that for the
contracts to be incentive compatible p(θ) must also be continuous.3 The overall proof is made
up of several Lemmas.
Lemma 1 Under a direct and truthful mechanism, there cannot be more than one type that
exerts his optimal -unconstrained- level of effort and for which the budget constraint binds, i.e.
p(θ) = 1
2
θ2G(mA −m(θ))2.
PROOF[by contradiction]: Consider type (θ−) and type θ, for which the budget constraints
are binding, namely p(θ) = 1
2
θ2G(mA − m(θ))2 and p(θ − ) = 12(θ − )2G(mA − m(θ − ))2.
Notice that type θ would be budget constrained under the contract of type (θ− ), whereas the
latter would exert his optimal level of effort under the contract of type θ. Under a direct and
truthful mechanism the following two conditions must hold:
θ2G(mA −m(θ))2 ≥ θ(θ − )G(mA −m(θ − ))2 (A-9)
(θ − )2G(mA −m(θ − ))2 ≥ 12(θ2 + (θ − )2)G(mA −m(θ))2 (A-10)
where (A-9) refers to the incentive compatibility constraint for type θ (agent θ gets higher utility
by reporting his true type than by reporting type (θ − )) and (A-10) refers to the incentive
compatibility constraint for type (θ− ) (agent (θ− ) gets higher utility by reporting his true
type than by reporting type θ). Rearranging (A-9) and (A-10) gives respectively:
θ
θ −  ≥
G(mA −m(θ − ))2
G(mA −m(θ))2
G(mA −m(θ − ))2
G(mA −m(θ))2 ≥
θ2 + (θ − )2
2(θ − )2
These two conditions cannot be simultaneously satisfied since θ
2+(θ−)2
2(θ−)2 >
θ
θ− :
⇔ θ
2 + (θ − )2
2(θ − ) > θ
⇔ θ2 + (θ − )2 > 2θ(θ − )
⇔ (θ − (θ − ))2 > 0
⇔ 2 > 0
which is true for any  6= 0. This proves Lemma 1.
Corollary 1 There can be only one interval in which the agent is budget constrained under a
direct and truthful mechanism, and this interval must include the highest type, θ = 1.
3Suppose that the optimal mechanism involves a downward (upward) jump in p(.) at the point θ = θ˜ while
m(.) is continuous in that point. Then, the contract (m(θ˜ + ), p(θ˜ + )) with  → 0 is less (more) attractive
than the contract (m(θ˜ − ), p(θ˜ − )) for all types, which implies that the incentive compatibility constraint is
violated.
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PROOF: By the continuity assumption on m(θ), p(θ) and g(m(θ), θ) = 1
2
θ2G(mA −m(θ))2
must also be continuous in θ. Therefore, if agents of type θ ∈ [θ, θ] ⊂ (0, 1) are budget
constrained under a direct and truthful mechanism, then it must be true that p(θ) = g(m, θ) and
that p(θ) = g(m, θ). However, Lemma 1 shows that under any implementable mechanism there
can’t be more than one type that exerts his optimal -unconstrained- level of effort and for which
the budget constraint is binding. Therefore under the direct and truthful mechanism there can’t
be an interval [θ, θ] ⊂ (0, 1) such that all types in that interval are budget constrained. Finally,
notice that type θ = 0 cannot be budget constrained since his optimal level of effort is equal
to zero. Corollary 1 then follows: under a direct and truthful mechanism the only interval of
types for which the budget constraints can be binding is of the form: [θ, 1]. It also implies that
p(θ) = 1
2
θ
2
G(mA −m(θ))2.
So we are left with three possible cases: θ = 1, i.e. no agent is budget constrained; θ → 0,
i.e. all agents are budget constrained; and θ ∈ (0, 1), i.e. types in [0, θ] exert their optimal
-unconstrained- level of effort, while types in [θ, 1] are budget constrained. I will now analyze
each of these cases separately.
Case 1: θ = 1
We are in the case in which all types in the interval [0, 1] exert their optimal -unconstrained-
level of effort. Together with Lemma 1, this implies that the budget constraint is binding
for the highest type, i.e. p(1) = 1
2
G(mA − m(1))2, and is slack for all remaining types, i.e.
p(θ) > 1
2
θ2G(mA −m(θ))2 ∀ θ ∈ [0, 1).
Lemma 2 If all types in the interval [0, 1] exert their optimal -unconstrained- level of effort
under a direct and truthful mechanism, then m(θ) must be non-decreasing in that interval.
To prove Lemma 2 I first need the following step:
Step 1 The agent always exerts his optimal -unconstrained- level of effort under deviation⇐⇒
m(θ) is non-decreasing.
PROOF: If the agent is never budget constrained under deviation, he exerts effort e =
θiG(mA−m(z)) for all z, the latter being the reported type. Thus, the incentive compatibility
constraint can be written as follows:
U(θ) = maxz∈Θ{p(z) + 12θ2G(mA −m(z))2}
Remind that we defined g(m, θ) = 1
2
θ2G(mA −m)2. Then:
∂g(m, θ)
∂m∂θ
= 2θG(mA −m)G′(mA −m)(−1) > 0
which implies that g(m, θ) has strict single crossing differences in (m, θ). By the Monotonic
Selection Theorem we then know that m(θ) must be non-decreasing. This proves the right
direction of the relationship in Step 1. Now suppose that under the direct and truthful mech-
anism m(θ) is increasing in the interval [0, 1]. For the incentive compatibility constraint to be
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satisfied, p(θ) must be decreasing in that interval since the agent’s utility is increasing in both
m(θ) and p(θ). Now, if agent θ deviates downwards, he gets a lower level of discretion and a
higher payment, so if he is not budget constrained by reporting his true type, he won’t be bud-
get constrained by reporting a lower type. If agent θ deviates upwards, he gets more discretion
and a lower payment. However, since by assumption type (θ + ) is not budget constrained by
reporting his true type, neither will be type θ by reporting (θ+). This proves the left direction
of the relationship in Step 1.
With step 1 in mind, I can now proceed with proof of Lemma 2:
PROOF[by contradiction]: Suppose that under the direct and truthful mechanism m(θ) is
decreasing in [0, 1]. Then, it is always possible to construct an interval [θ − , θ + ] ⊂ [0, 1]
in which the agent would exert his optimal - unconstrained- level effort under deviations in
that interval. If m(θ) is decreasing, by reporting type z = (θ + ) rather than his true type,
agent θ would get a higher payment and less discretion, so he would not be budget constrained.
As far as deviations downwards are concerned, let’s first remind that by Lemma 1 the budget
constraints must be slack for all types [0, 1). Therefore, by the continuity assumption above,
there must always exist an  small enough such that
p(θ) > p(θ − ) ≥ 1
2
θ2G(mA −m(θ − ))2 > 12θ2G(mA −m(θ))2
which means that under the contract for type (θ− ), agent θ exerts his optimal level of effort.
From step 1 we know that m(θ) must be non-decreasing in the interval [θ − , θ + ], which
contradicts the initial assumption of m(θ) being decreasing in [0, 1]. This proves Lemma 2.
Lemma 3 There is always a pooling contract that gives the principal a higher utility than a
(full or partial) separating contract under which all types exert their optimal - unconstrained-
level of effort.
PROOF: Suppose there is a contract (ms(θ), ps(θ)) that (fully or partially) separates on the
entire interval of types, [0, 1], and under which any agent is exerting his optimal - unconstrained-
level of effort. From Lemma 2 we know that for such contract to be implementable, ms(θ) must
be non-decreasing in [0, 1], which in turn implies that ps(θ) must be non-increasing. Therefore,
the following inequalities must hold:
ms(1) ≥ ms(θ) ∀ θ (A-11)
ps(θ) ≥ ps(1) = 1
2
G(mA −ms(1))2 ∀ θ (A-12)
I will now show that the principal gets a higher utility by offering the following pooling contract
to all types :
mp = min{ms(1), m˜} (A-13)
pp = min{1
2
G(mA −ms(1))2, 12G(mA − m˜)2} (A-14)
where m˜ = arg maxm Y (θ,m) = θθDG(m − mD)G(mA − m). In other words, m˜ is the
mission that maximizes the utility that the principal gets from the project’s output if the
agent exerts his optimal -unconstrained- level of effort. Notice that m˜ does not depend on θ.
Recall that the principal’s expected utility from allocating the contract to an agent of type θ
is E(VD) =
∫ 1
0
(Y (θ,m)− p(θ))f(θ)dθ.
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Suppose ms(1) < m˜. This means that, everything else being equal, the principal could
increase his utility by increasing the level of discretion of all agents. More specifically, by
offering a contract with mission mp = ms(1) and payment pp = 1
2
G(mA −ms(1))2 to all types,
the latter would still exert their optimal - unconstrained - level of effort, so the principal would
not only increase Y (θ,m) for all types but, by (A-12), he would also decrease p(θ) for all types.
Therefore, under that pooling contract principal’s utility will be unambiguously higher than
under any implementable (full or partial) separating contract (ms(θ), ps(θ)).
Suppose now that ms(1) > m˜. Then, everything else being equal, the principal could in-
crease his utility by increasing the level of discretion of those types for which ms(θ) < m˜ and
by decreasing the level of discretion of those types for which ms(θ) > m˜. More specifically,
by offering a contract with mission mp = m˜ and payment pp = 1
2
G(mA − m˜)2 to all types,
the latter would still exert their optimal -unconstrained- level of effort, so the principal would
not only increase Y (θ,m) for all types, but by equation (A-12) and the fact that ms(1) > m˜,
he would also decrease p(θ) for all types. Therefore, under that pooling contract principal’s
utility will be unambiguously higher than under any implementable (full or partial) separating
contract (ms(θ), ps(θ)). This proves Lemma 3. We now turn to the case in which all types are
budget constrained.
Case 2: θ → 0
The maximization problem faced by the principal when all types are budget constrained is
max
m,p
VD = θDG(m(θ)−mD)
√
2p(θ)− p(θ)
s.t. p(θ) < 1
2
G(mA −m(θ))2 ∀θ
Note that it does not depend directly on θ. The solution to the unconstrained problem is to
offer the pooling contract (mD, p =
1
2
θ2DG(0)
2) to all types. However, for this solution to be
feasible it must satisfy the inequality constraints p(θ) < 1
2
G(mA −m(θ))2 ∀ θ. In other words,
it must be true that
e = min{θG(mA −mD), θDG(0)} = θDG(0) ∀θ ∈ [0, 1]
This condition never holds for any θ < θD. Therefore, under the optimal mechanism there must
be some types who exert their optimal -unconstrained- level of effort. We now look at that last
case.
Case 3: θ ∈ (0, 1)
Suppose types in the interval [0, θ] exert their optimal -unconstrained- level of effort, while
types in the interval [θ, 1] are budget constrained. The budget constraint binds for type θ,
i.e. p(θ) = 1
2
θ
2
G(mA −m(θ))2. This part of the proof is divided in two Lemmas. In the first
Lemma I prove that there exists no incentive compatible mechanism with decreasing m(θ),
in the second Lemma I prove that there always exists a pooling contract that outperforms a
separating mechanism with increasing m(θ).
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Lemma 4 There exists no implementable mechanism in which m(θ) is (partly or fully) de-
creasing in the interval of types who are budget constrained.
PROOF: From Lemma 2 we know that under any direct and truthful mechanism m(θ) must
be non-decreasing in the interval [0, θ]. Now suppose that m(θ) is partly or fully decreasing
in the interval [θ, 1]. This implies that m(θ) must be -strictly- increasing in the interval [0, θ].
Indeed, notice that p(θ) must reach a global maximum at θ = 0 - and therefore m(θ) must
reach a global minimum at θ = 0 - otherwise type 0 who does not care about any mission would
deviate to the contract with the highest payment.
Now suppose that m(θ) is increasing in the interval [θ, θˆ] and decreasing in the interval
[θˆ, θˇ], with θ < θˆ < θˇ ≤ 1. It follows that the function m(θ) reaches a local maximum at θ = θˆ.
Thus, some types below θˆ must receive the same contract as some types above θˆ. Suppose type
(θˆ − ) receives the same contract, (m˜, p˜), as type (θˆ + y), where , y > 0, and (θˆ − ) > θ. On
the other hand, type θˆ receives the contract (mˆ, pˆ). The utility of agent θˆ when reporting is
truth type is
U(θˆ, θˆ) = θˆG(mA − mˆ)
√
2pˆ
Whereas his utility when reporting type (θˆ − ) is
U(θˆ, θˆ − ) = θˆG(mA − m˜)
√
2p˜
Indeed, if type (θˆ − ) is budget constrained under contract (m˜, p˜), so will be type θˆ. For
the incentive compatibility constraint to hold, it must be true that U(θˆ, θˆ) ≥ U(θˆ, θˆ − ), i.e.
G(mA − mˆ)
√
2pˆ ≥ G(mA − m˜)
√
2p˜. Similarly, the utility of agent (θˆ + y) when revealing his
true type is
U(θˆ + y, θˆ + y) = (θˆ + y)G(mA − m˜)
√
2p˜
Whereas his utility when reporting type θˆ is
U(θˆ + y, θˆ) = (θˆ + y)G(mA − mˆ)
√
2pˆ
Under a direct and incentive compatible mechanism it must hold that U(θˆ+ y, θˆ+ y) ≥ U(θˆ+
y, θˆ), i.e. G(mA− m˜)
√
2p˜ ≥ G(mA− mˆ)
√
2pˆ. This is a contradiction with what I found above.
The incentive compatibility constraints of type θˆ and of type θˆ + y cannot be simultaneously
satisfied unless contract (m˜, p˜) is equal to contract (mˆ, pˆ). This is true for any θˆ −  > θ, any
θˆ + y, and any θˇ.
I am now left to check what happens when m(θ) starts decreasing at θ = θ. This implies
that m(θ) reaches a local maximum at θ = θ. It follows that each type in the interval [θ, 1] is
offered the same contract as a lower type θ < θ who is not budget constrained. Indeed if this
was not the case, there would be contracts with same missions but different payments, so this
mechanism would not be incentive compatible. It follows that each contract offered to types
that are budget constrained, namely to θ ∈ [θ, 1], must also satisfy the incentive compatibility
constraint of a type that exerts his optimal - unconstrained- level of effort, θ ∈ [0, θ]. I will now
show that this is not possible. More specifically, I will show that under such mechanism, types
(θ, 1] have an incentive to deviate to the contract of type θ.
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Suppose, for instance, that type (θ + ) with  > 0 is offered the same contract as type
θˆ ∈ [0, θ), which we define as (mˆ, pˆ). As stated above, this contract must satisfy the incentive
compatibility constraint of type θˆ. Since ms(θ) is increasing in [0, θ], agent θˆ exerts his optimal
-unconstrained- level of effort under his contract and, by Step 1, also under any deviation in
[0, θ]. More generally, I can write the incentive compatibility constraint of type θ ∈ [0, θ] as
follows:
U(θ) = max
z∈[0,θ]
{p(z) + 1
2
θ2G(mA −m(z))2}
Applying the envelope theorem, the next steps are standard:
U ′(θ) = θG(mA −m(θ))2
U(θ) = U(0) +
∫ θ
0
tG(mA −m(t))2dt
From there we can easily pin down pˆ as a function of mˆ:
pˆ = p(mˆ) = p(0)− 1
2
θˆ2G(mA − mˆ)2 +
∫ θˆ
0
tG(mA −m(t))2dt (A-15)
where θˆ = m−1(mˆ), so θˆ is a function of mˆ. Therefore, we can write down the utility of type
(θ + ) when he reports his type truthfully, as a function of mˆ :
U(θ + , mˆ) = (θ + )G(mA − mˆ)
√
2p(mˆ) (A-16)
Now, it is important to notice that if type (θ+) does not report his type truthfully but deviates
downwards, he will still remain budget constrained. Indeed, if type (θ+ − y), with − y ≥ 0,
is budget constrained under his own contract (mˇ, pˇ)4, so will be type (θ + ) under that same
contract. This means that the utility of type (θ + ) by reporting type (θ + − y) will be
U(θ + , mˇ) = (θ + )G(mA − mˇ)
√
2p(mˇ) (A-17)
A sufficient condition for this mechanism not to be incentive compatible is U(θ + , mˇ) >
U(θ + , mˆ) for all  > 0. Since mˇ > mˆ, this is true if and only if U(θ + , mˆ) is strictly
increasing in mˆ for all . I will now show that this is indeed the case.
Let’s first calculate:
dp(mˆ)
dmˆ
=
∂p
∂θˆ
θˆ′(mˆ) +
∂p
∂mˆ
(A-18)
Notice that ∂p
∂θˆ
= 0, so the expression above simplifies to
dp(mˆ)
dmˆ
= −θˆ2G(mA − mˆ)G′(mA − mˆ)(−1)
Using the product rule we then get:
∂U(θ + , mˆ)
∂mˆ
=
(
θ + 
)(
G′(mA − mˆ)(−1)
√
2pˆ− G(mA − mˆ)√
2pˆ
θˆ2G(mA − mˆ)G′(mA − mˆ)(−1)
)
4It is important to remind that all types in the interval (θ, 1] receive the same contract as a lower type in
the interval [0, θ). Therefore, also the contract (mˇ, pˇ) must satisfy equation (A-15)
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Rearranging the expression above we get:
∂U(θ + , mˆ)
∂mˆ
=
(
θ + 
)(
G′(mA − mˆ)(−1)
(√
2pˆ− θˆ
2G(mA − mˆ)2√
2pˆ
))
(A-19)
whose sign depends on the term
(√
2pˆ− θˆ2G(mA−mˆ)2√
2pˆ
)
. Since θˆ ∈ [0, θ) then it must be true that
√
2pˆ > θˆG(mA−mˆ). This implies that the sign of
(√
2pˆ− θˆ2G(mA−mˆ)2√
2pˆ
)
is positive, and so is the
sign of (A-19). This holds for any pairs θˆ and  > 0. So we conclude that types θ ∈ (θ, 1] want
to deviate to the contract with the highest m, that is, to the contract of type θ. Therefore, a
mechanism with decreasing m(θ) in the interval [θ, 1] is never incentive compatible. This proves
Lemma 4.
I now look at the case with increasing m(θ).
Lemma 5 There is always a pooling contract that gives the principal a higher utility than any
(partial or full) separating contract with non-decreasing m(θ) and binding budget constraints
for types [θ, 1].
To prove Lemma 5 we first need the following step:
Step 2 Under the optimal mechanism, the utility that the principal gets from contracting with
the highest type must be at least as large as the utility he gets from contracting with any lower
type, i.e. VD(1,m(1), p(1)) ≥ VD(θ,m(θ), p(θ)) ∀ θ < 1.
PROOF[by contradiction]: Suppose that under the optimal mechanism agent θˆ receives the
contract (m(θˆ), p(θˆ)), which gives the principal an utility equal to VD(θˆ, m(θˆ), p(θˆ)). It is then
straightforward to verify that by offering this same contract to a higher type, the principal
gets at least this same level of utility, namely VD(θ,m(θˆ), p(θˆ)) ≥ VD(θˆ, m(θˆ), p(θˆ)) ∀ θ > θˆ. It
follows that the principal can always improve upon a mechanism in which his utility is highest
at θ = θˆ by offering the same contract offered to θˆ to all θ ∈ (θˆ, 1]. This holds for any θˆ < 1.
Therefore under the optimal mechanism, the contact offered to type 1 must generate to the
principal at least the same level of utility as any other contract offered to a lower type.
With step 2 in mind, we now proceed with proving Lemma 5.
PROOF: Suppose there is an original contract (ms(θ), ps(θ)) that separates over the full
interval of types and that the budget constraints bind in the interval [θ, 1]. From Lemma 2 we
know that under any incentive compatible separating mechanism, ms(.) must be increasing in
the interval [0, θ]. So now suppose that ms(.) is also increasing in the interval [θ, 1], such that
ms(.) is increasing and ps(.) is decreasing in the entire interval of types. From Step 2 we know
that since the contract is separating on the interval [θ, 1]:
V fcD (m
s(1), ps(1)) ≥ V fcD (ms(θ), ps(θ)) ∀ θ ∈ [θ, 1)
where V fcD (m
s(θ), ps(θ)) is the utility that the principal gets from agent θ when the latter
is budget constrained under his contract. Similarly, we define by V nfcD (θ,m
s(θ), ps(θ)) the
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utility that the principal gets from agent θ when the latter exerts his optimal -unconstrained
- level of effort under his contract. There can be three scenarios: m˜ > ms(1) > ms(θ),
ms(1) > ms(θ) > m˜, and ms(1) > m˜ > ms(θ), where m˜ is defined as before, namely m˜ =
arg maxm Y (θ,m) = θθDG(m−mD)G(mA −m).
Suppose m˜ > ms(1) > ms(θ). I will now show that the principal is better off by offer-
ing the pooling contract (ms(1), ps(1)) to all types. Assume he does so. Under the contract
(ms(1), ps(1)), types in the interval [θ, 1] are still budget constrained since they get more dis-
cretion and a lower payment than in the original contract. Therefore, they generate utility for
the principal equal to V fcD (m
s(1), ps(1)). From step 2, we then know that principal’s utility
from these types has increased with respect to the original contract. Let’s now look at the
interval [0, θ]. Let’s define by θˆ the lowest type for which the budget constraint binds under
the contract (ms(1), ps(1)) . Then, types [0, θˆ] exert their optimal level of effort as under the
original contract. From Lemma 3 we know that principal’s utility has increased with respect
to the original contract for types in that interval. Finally, let’s look at the interval [θˆ, θ]. These
types are budget constrained under the contract (ms(1), ps(1)). Therefore, they generate utility
for the principal equal to V fcD (m
s(1), ps(1)). From Step 2, we then know that principal’s utility
from these types has increased with respect to any original contract. This proves that the prin-
cipal is better off by offering the pooling contract (ms(1), ps(1)) than the original separating
contract.
Suppose now that ms(1) > ms(θ) > m˜. I will show that in this case the principal is better
off by offering the pooling contract (m˜, ps(1)) to all types. Let’s define by θˆ the lowest type
that is budget constrained under that contract. Assume θˆ > θ. Then, for all θ ∈ [θˆ, 1], the
pooling contract (m˜, ps(1)) yields a higher utility to the principal than the original separating
contract, m˜ being lower than ms(1) :
V fcD (m˜, p
s(1)) = θDG(m˜−mD)
√
2ps(1)− ps(1) > V fcD (ms(1), ps(1)) (A-20)
For all θ ∈ [0, θ], who exert their optimal level of effort under both contracts, the pooling
contract also yields a higher utility to the principal as m˜ maximizes Y (θ,m) and ps(1) < ps(θ)
∀ θ. Finally, let’s consider types in the the interval [θ, θˆ]. For these types the budget constraints
were binding under the original contract but not under the pooling contract. Thus, under the
original contract principal’s utility from contracting with these types is equal to:
V fcD (m
s(θ), ps(θ)) = θDG(m
s(θ)−mD)
√
2ps(θ)− ps(θ) (A-21)
Since
√
2ps(θ) < θG(mA −ms(θ)), notice that:
V nfcD (θ,m
s(θ), ps(θ)) = θDθG(m
s(θ)−mD)G(mA−ms(θ))− ps(θ) ≥ V fcD (ms(θ), ps(θ)) (A-22)
Under the pooling contract principal ’s utility from contracting with these types is equal to:
V nfcD (θ, m˜, p
s(1)) = θDθG(m˜−mD)G(mA − m˜)− ps(1) (A-23)
which, since m˜ maximizes Y (θ,m) and ps(1) < ps(θ) ∀ θ, leads us to the following inequality:
V nfcD (θ, m˜, p
s(1)) > V nfcD (θ,m
s(θ), ps(θ)) ≥ V fcD (ms(θ), ps(θ)) (A-24)
This proves that the principal is better off by offering the pooling contract (m˜, ps(1)).
77
Now assume θˆ < θ. Using the same arguments as above, we know that principal’s utility
increases by offering the pooling contract to all types in the intervals [0, θˆ] and [θ, 1], since these
types are either budget constrained or not under both contracts. It is left to check principal’s
utility for types in the interval [θˆ, θ]. These types are budget constrained under the pooling
contract (m˜, ps(1)) but not under the original contract. In the latter case, principal’s utility
from contracting with these types is given by V nfcD (θ,m
s(θ), ps(θ)). Notice that by step 2,
V nfcD (θ,m
s(θ), ps(θ)) must be smaller than V fcD (m
s(1), ps(1)) ∀ θ ∈ [θˆ, θ]. Then, the following
inequality must hold:
V fcD (m˜, p
s(1)) > V fcD (m
s(1), ps(1)) > V nfcD (θ,m
s(θ), ps(θ))
which proves that the principal is better off by offering the pooling contract (m˜, ps(1)) also
types in the interval [θˆ, θ] rather than the original separating contract.
Last, suppose ms(1) > m˜ > ms(θ) and that the principal offers the pooling contract
(m˜, ps(1)) to all types. Let again define by θˆ the lowest type that is budget constrained under
that pooling contract. It is easy to verify that θˆ < θ and, using the same arguments as above,
that the principal is better off than by offering the original separating contract.
Finally, similar arguments apply if the original contract is pooling in the interval in which
the agents are budget constrained, i.e. if m(θ) = ms(θ) for all θ ∈ [θ, 1]. Since agents [θ, 1]
are budget constrained, they all generate an utility to the principal that is equal to the util-
ity generated by type θ. Similarly, types [θ, 1] are also budget constrained under the pooling
contract (mp, pp) defined in (A-13) and (A-14), and therefore they would all generate the same
utility to the principal as type θ under that contract. In Lemma 3 we saw that the principal
gets a higher utility by offering that pooling contract to all types [0, θ] - so including to type θ
- rather than any separating contract. Therefore, he also gets a higher utility by offering that
same pooling contract to types (θ, 1]. This completes the proof of Lemma 5.
To summarize, Lemma 3 and 5 show that there always exists a pooling contract that gives
the principal a higher utility than any (full or partial) separating contract with increasing m(θ).
Lemma 1 and Lemma 4 show that a (full or partial) separating contract with decreasing m(θ)
is never implementable. This leads to Proposition 6. More specifically, the optimal pooling
contract solves:
max
m,p
θDG(m−mD)
[(
1− F
( √2p
G(mA −m)
))√
2p+
∫ √2p
G(mA−m)
0
θG(mA −m)f(θ)dθ
]
− p
which leads to the following FOCs:
G′(m−mD)
(
1− F
( √2p
G(mA −m)
))√
2p+
[G′(m−mD)G(mA −m)−G(m−mD)G′(mA −m)]
∫ √2p
G(mA−m)
0
θG(mA −m)f(θ)dθ = 0
θDG(m−mD)
(
1− F
( √2p
G(mA −m)
)) 1√
2p
− 1 = 0 (A-25)
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Notice that for (A-25) to be satisfied, the term
(
1 − F
( √
2p
G(mA−m)
))
, namely the probability
of an agent to be budget constrained, must be higher than zero. This implies that under the
optimal pooling contract some types are budget constrained.
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Appendix B
Appendix: Chapter 3
Table B.1: Piece rate choices of principals with different survey responses
(1) (2) (3)
RE Probit RE
fair to pay lower wage 0.205* 0.574* 0.100
(0.123) (0.327) (0.086)
constant 0.386*** –0.323 0.179**
(0.093) (0.271) (0.070)
Round FE? Yes Yes Yes
Session FE? Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE? No No No
Adj. R2
Observations 730 730 730
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Regression (1) and (2) include only observations within
the main treatment and open contract. Regression (3) includes only observations within the main treatment
and closed contract. The dependent variable is binary and takes value 1 if the offered piece rate is below 5 and
value 0 otherwise. The independent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if, in the survey conducted at the
end of the experiment, the principal reported that he would offer a lower wage to a motivated job candidate,
and 0 otherwise. Significance levels: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1.
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Figure B.1: Effort over time for a piece rate= 1. Averages shown by the dots for the
respective type of contract and treatment, quadratic time trend shown by the lines for each
type of contract and treatment. In total, 73 subjects participated in each type of contract and
treatment.
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Figure B.2: Effort over time for a piece rate= 2. Averages shown by the dots for the
respective type of contract and treatment, quadratic time trend shown by the lines for each
type of contract and treatment. In total, 73 subjects participated in each type of contract and
treatment.
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Figure B.3: Effort over time for a piece rate= 3. Averages shown by the dots for the
respective type of contract and treatment, quadratic time trend shown by the lines for each
type of contract and treatment. In total, 73 subjects participated in each type of contract and
treatment.
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Figure B.4: Effort over time for a piece rate= 4. Averages shown by the dots for the
respective type of contract and treatment, quadratic time trend shown by the lines for each
type of contract and treatment. In total, 73 subjects participated in each type of contract and
treatment.
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Figure B.5: Effort over time for a piece rate= 5. Averages shown by the dots for the
respective type of contract and treatment, quadratic time trend shown by the lines for each
type of contract and treatment. In total, 73 subjects participated in each type of contract and
treatment.
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Figure B.6: Effort over time for a piece rate= 6. Averages shown by the dots for the
respective type of contract and treatment, quadratic time trend shown by the lines for each
type of contract and treatment. In total, 73 subjects participated in each type of contract and
treatment.
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Figure B.7: Effort over time for a piece rate= 7. Averages shown by the dots for the
respective type of contract and treatment, quadratic time trend shown by the lines for each
type of contract and treatment. In total, 73 subjects participated in each type of contract and
treatment.
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Figure B.8: Effort over time for a piece rate= 8. Averages shown by the dots for the
respective type of contract and treatment, quadratic time trend shown by the lines for each
type of contract and treatment. In total, 73 subjects participated in each type of contract and
treatment.
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Figure B.9: Effort over time for a piece rate= 9. Averages shown by the dots for the
respective type of contract and treatment, quadratic time trend shown by the lines for each
type of contract and treatment. In total, 73 subjects participated in each type of contract and
treatment.
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Figure B.10: Piece rates over time. Averages shown by the dots for the respective type of
contract and treatment, quadratic time trend shown by the lines for each type of contract and
treatment. In total, 73 subjects participated in each type of contract and treatment.
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Figure B.11: Contract choice over time. Averages shown by the dots for the respective
treatment, quadratic time trend shown by the lines for each treatment. In total, 73 subjects
participated in each treatment.
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Figure B.12: Average realized effort and piece rate
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Figure B.13: Average realized profit
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Figure B.14: Beliefs about effort
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Figure B.15: Piece rate distribution
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Figure B.16: Piece rate difference across contracts for sub-sample of principals. Av-
erage piece rate offered by 14% of principals (n = 10) who, in a survey conducted at the end
of the experiment, said that they would offer a lower wage to motivated job candidate.
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Figure B.17: Piece rates over time for sub-sample of principals. Averages shown by the
dots for the respective type of contract and treatment, quadratic time trend shown by the lines
for each type of contract and treatment. Only observations from the principals who, in the
survey, reported that they would offer a lower wage to a motivated job candidate are included.
In total, 10 subjects participated in each type of contract and treatment.
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Appendix C
Appendix: Chapter 4
Table C.1: Effect of income generation on CHF distributed to LoLot
Control for effort None Linear Quadratic FE (10) FE(5) FE(2.5)
Constant 18.50*** 20.86*** 23.22*** 16.93*** 17.51*** 17.21***
(0.75) (2.05) (3.03) (5.74) (5.83) (5.76)
LoTour -2.09* -2.44** -2.19* -1.93 -2.51* -2.21*
(1.07) (1.11) (1.13) (1.17) (1.27) (1.30)
F-test contr. (p) 0.218 0.270 0.206 0.397 0.318
N 115 115 115 115 115 115
R2 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.19 0.28 0.40
Adj. R2 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.07
Ordinary least squares regressions. Dependent variable: CHF distributed to LoLot. Sample: LoLot and
LoTour. FE(x) means fixed effects for effort bins of size x. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Standard errors
in parentheses.
Table C.2: Effect of income generation on CHF distributed to LoTour
Control for effort None Linear Quadratic FE(10) FE(5) FE(2.5)
Constant 9.87*** 15.50*** 16.13*** 12.31 13.31* 12.86
(0.99) (2.66) (3.96) (7.62) (7.73) (7.78)
LoTour 3.90*** 3.06** 3.13** 2.69* 1.69 2.14
(1.41) (1.44) (1.48) (1.55) (1.68) (1.76)
F-test contr. (p) 0.025 0.080 0.258 0.438 0.496
N 115 115 115 115 115 115
R2 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.21 0.29 0.39
Adj. R2 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.05
Ordinary least squares regressions. Dependent variable: CHF distributed to LoTour. Sample: LoLot and
LoTour. FE(x) means fixed effects for effort bins of size x. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Standard errors
in parentheses.
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Table C.3: Effect of income from effort on belief about tournament
Control for effort None Linear Quadratic FE(10) FE(5) FE(2.5)
Constant 4.46*** 4.48*** 5.68*** 7.00*** 7.00*** 7.00***
(0.27) (0.77) (1.25) (1.96) (1.94) (1.97)
HiTour -1.45*** -1.44*** -1.56*** -1.41*** -1.48*** -1.38**
(0.38) (0.46) (0.47) (0.49) (0.52) (0.58)
F-test contr. (p) 0.980 0.484 0.092 0.102 0.279
N 112 112 112 112 112 112
R2 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.28 0.37 0.46
Adj. R2 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.17 0.19 0.16
Ordinary least squares regressions. Dependent variable: Belief about luck dependence of tournament. Sample:
HiTour and LoTour. FE(x) means fixed effects for effort bins of size x. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure C.1: Histograms of distributive decisions of HiLot and LoLot for pair from lottery
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Figure C.2: Histograms of distributive decisions of HiTour and LoTour for pair from tournament
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Figure C.3: Histograms of beliefs of HiTour and LoTour for tournament
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Figure C.4: Histograms of beliefs of HiLot and LoLot for lottery
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